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The expert (technē) analogy often plays an essential role in the arguments of Xenophon, Plato 
and Aristotle, and this type of argument can be traced back to Socrates. Yet there has been 
remarkably little work done on the argument itself. Vlastos, and to a lesser degree Robinson, 
interprets the majority of expert-analogies as intuitive inductions, where the conclusion is 
built into the concept of an expert and thus it is not an actual inference. On the other side 
McPherran, and to a lesser degree Santas, interprets them as probable inductions, i.e. an 
inference based on an insufficient number of cases or an insufficient number of similar 
attributes between the analogous cases, yielding a probable inference. 
This thesis tries to defend a third alternative, where the expert-analogy is understood 
as an inference from one species to another species, the inference being valid as there is a 
common genus to which the attribute inferred belongs per se. Thus the analogy is interpreted 
to have a valid deductive structure. It is claimed that a similar analogical structure can be 
found in other types of proofs, e.g. the homological proof found in evolutionary biology. It is 
further argued that this structure can be found in Aristotle’s discussion of the argument by 
example (paradeigma), and further that a justification can be found in Aristotle’s four-part 
division of identity into that of quantity, species, genus and analogy – and it is claimed that 
the expert-analogy is in fact based on an identity in genus. Indications can also be found in 
Plato, but these were not developed further by him. And in addition, the Aristotelian principle 
that a proof should be at its most generic level further justifies the proposed structure of the 
expert-analogy. Finally this structure is used in the discussion of several controversial cases of 
the expert-analogy, hopefully showing that the proposed structure is applicable to the various 
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The following dissertation should be of interest both to those already well acquainted with 
parts or all of the philosophical problems discussed, but also to novices on the current subject. 
To draw an analogy, Isocrates in his Against the Sophists 14-15
1
 separates those of his 
students with the natural ability to become excellent speakers from those of an inferior nature. 
Both of these types of students can benefit from education in rhetoric, and should thus 
become students of Isocrates. Just the same, both of my type of readers can benefit from 
reading this dissertation, though the reader who is already well acquainted with the issue will 
understand the dissertation better. But both types should read it. 
All abbreviations of ancient authors and texts where available are from the list of 
abbreviations in Liddell & Scott. All translations of Plato are from the Complete Works edited 
by John M. Cooper, unless otherwise indicated. All translations of Aristotle are from the 
Complete Works edited by Jonathan Barnes, unless otherwise indicated. Square brackets 
within quotations indicate my own additions. 
It has been my general policy to translate Greek words, rather than simply using the 
Greek words by themselves. Where necessary for clarification I have added the Greek 
original. The reason for this is that by giving a translation I convey the additional information 
to the reader of how I think the word should be translated, and thus which connotations one 
should have to the word.  
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There is a type of argument that is frequent in Plato’s dialogues, as well as in the Socratic 
writings of Xenophon and Aristotle (among other works the Nicomachean Ethics). In fact, it 
is used so frequent that both Plato and Xenophon refer to this type of argument as tired and 
worn out. “He’s always going on about pack asses, or blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners; 
he’s always making the same tired old points in the same tired old words [...] But [...] you’ll 
realize that no other arguments make any sense.” (Smp. 221e-222a) “By the gods! You simply 
don’t let up on your continual talk of shoemakers and cleaners, cooks and doctors, as if our 
discussion were about them!” (Grg. 491a) “[...] you will have to avoid your favourite topic,--
the cobblers, builders and metal workers; for it is already worn to rags by you in my opinion.” 
(Mem. I.II.37) 
Analogy is extremely frequent in the dialogues of Plato. ‘As this, so that’ is his refrain 
[...] It disappears to some extent in the later work; but the early and middle dialogues 
are full of it.” (Robinson 1953: 205) 
And again, “a very large number of the Platonic analogies, perhaps more than half, contain 
the notion of techne-episteme, which is in English the tetrad knowledge-science-art-technics.” 
(Robinson 1953: 206) Briefly put, the expert-analogy is the paradigmatic case of an analogy 
for Plato, and is so frequently used that Plato (as well as Xenophon) allows himself to be 
ironic and make jokes about it. Yet remarkably few have discussed the logical structure of the 
expert-analogies. In this paper I will present an interpretation of how these expert-analogies 
work, and assess their logical validity. Following Robinson, one might classify the present 
thesis as a work in the history of logic. It does however defend a logically valid form of 
analogies, and in this regard it is more a work in philosophy of logic. In addition the expert-
analogies were used in large part to prove a conclusion in ethics, and many of the examples 
discussed here will concern ethics. A reason for this might be that the expert-analogy is 
usually traced to the historical Socrates
2
, and it is believed that he mainly concerned himself 
with ethics. 
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 I will not be concerned much with the historical Socrates in this thesis. Unless otherwise noted when I refer to 
Socrates I mean the dramatic character figuring in the Socratic dialogues of Plato and Xenophon. 
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There are good reasons to assume that this type of analogy has come down to us from 
Socrates, which can be called by the term Socratic analogy, or more specifically the expert-
analogy (why it is called by this name will soon be made evident). Aristotle said that “two 
things may be fairly ascribed by Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both 
of which are concerned with the starting-point of science.” (Metaph. 1078b27-29) Here 
‘inductive arguments’ translates the Greek ™pagwg», however the arguments that Aristotle 
must be thinking of are better viewed as analogies. But the secondary literature sometimes 
refers to it as ™pagwg», i.e. ‘induction’, at other times as analogy. 
An example of this type of argument can be found in Men. 90c-91b. P1: to learn to 
become a good physician one should go to a physician. P2: to learn to become a good 
shoemaker one should go to a shoemaker. P3: and the same for any other pursuits. C1: to 
learn an expertise one should go to those who practices the expertise, and among these to 
those who exact fees and have shown themselves to be teachers. P4: it would be foolish to 
refuse to send someone that want to learn flute-playing or the other expertise to those who 
profess to teach the expertise for a fee. P5: Meno longs to acquire virtue. P6: The sophists 
profess to teach virtue for a fee. C2: Meno should be sent to the sophists to learn virtue. 
This is quite a memorable example with a striking conclusion. Now there are several 
obvious characteristics of this argument. Firstly, all the examples (the physician, shoemaker, 
etc.) are different kinds of experts (tšcnai). The word that I translate as expertise (tšcnh) can 
also be translated as craft, art, science, trade, profession, skill, technique, or negatively as 
cunning or trick. I have consistently translated this term and all its cognates as ‘an expert’ if 
referring to the practitioner, or ‘an expertise’ if referring to the field that the expert is a 
practitioner of. When quoting other commentators you will find different translations, mainly 
as ‘craft’ or ‘art’. I think translating it as expertise conveys the proper connotations. It is 
someone that is an expert on a certain field. Translating it as craft usually makes it too 
narrow, not fitting every case. A craft gives the connotation of a maker of physical objects of 
a practical nature, e.g. the shoemaker. But we will see that expertise is a much wider term 
than that
3. Likewise art seems too narrow, and it gives the connotations of ‘fine art’, which is 
hardly representative for all the expertise. 
Secondly, one can see from the example that the analogy proceed from a few cases of 
various experts, claiming that these exhibit certain attributes, namely that to learn an expertise 
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 Cf. ’I argue that for Plato ”techne” does not exclusively refer to productive knowledge. Instead ,it is a much 
more flexible term covering a wide range of different kinds of arts, sciences, and crafts.’ (Roochnik 1992: 186) 
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one should go to those practicing and teaching this expertise for a fee. Then one argues from 
these particular experts possessing these attributes, to the conclusion that a different expert 
also must possess these attributes, namely that the sophist also has these attributes. In other 
words, it is inference from one or more particulars, to another particular. But the analogy does 
not seem to be a straight inference from one particular to another. As Joseph puts it, this 
“inference from particular to particular works through an implicit universal principle.” 
(Joseph 1916: 542) In the example above the implicit principle is made explicit in C1, 
together with the unstated premise that virtue is an expertise. The way this is usually taken is 
that the particulars inductively prove the universal principle, but the particulars do not seem 
necessarily to justify the universal. To paraphrase Russell, the chicken’s inference that the 
farmer will feed him every day is not valid, as the farmer one day breaks the chicken’s neck 
instead. Thus, taken that way, the analogy seems problematic. And in contrast, any inference 
based merely on a similarity between two things, without some sort of universal principle, 
seems to make for a poor argument. There is simply nothing connecting the premise and the 
conclusion. E.g. the earth is populated, therefore the moon is populated. Taken this way, the 
conclusion does not follow from the premises. And again the analogy seems problematic. 
 
I. 1 Particulars and universals, genus and differentia 
 
At this point I want to clarify exactly what I mean with an analogy, as this word is often used 
equivocally. “There is no word, however, which is used more loosely, or in greater variety of 
senses, than analogy.” (Mill’s A System of Logic ch. 20 § 1.) With analogy I mean any 
inference from particular to particular. A particular must not be confused with a concrete – the 
particulars that Socrates use are not concrete examples, e.g. Sophroniscus the sculptor. Rather 
they are a sculptor, and the sculptor being used as a particular, viz. a case, of the universal 
‘expert’. In another sense, the cases used are universals, e.g. the universal sculptor, but the 
cases always have a superordinate universal. To use Plato’s terminology, the analogies are all 
between ideas, and not between appearances. It would be a grave mistake to view the 
Aristotelian dichotomy of universal and particular as another variant of the Platonic 
dichotomy of idea and appearance
4
. 
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 Indeed Aristotle criticises Plato for not seeing the difference. “For Aristotle’s commonest objection to the 
Theory of Forms is that it confuses the general with the particular.” (Owen 1978-1979: 9) 
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To this set of concepts must be added that of genus and species. In many respects this 
pair of concepts is similar to that of universal and particular. Species is equally relative, and 
can refer to anything from the infima species, the lowest order, to the second highest. It only 
needs a single genus to be higher than it, to be more general. Thus a concept can be a species 
relative to one thing, and a genus relative to another. But the genus and species stands in a 
very specific relation to each other, such that the genus is the natural kind of the species. It is 
not just that the genus is more general, but the species is defined by the genus in combination 
with a differentia. 
I think it is now clear what I mean with universal and particular, as well as genus and 
species.  Still it might be objected that this talk of natural kinds, of genus and species, surely 
must be outdated concepts by long ago. Take for instance the following criticism from Acton: 
The philosopher whose attention is engrossed with abstract universals will regard the 
objects of the world as grouped together in classes, the members of which possess a 
common quality. The knowledge which he gains by means of abstract universals will 
thus be liable to two defects. (a) In the first place it will be confined to classes, at the 
expense of those groups, whose members are more closely associated that the 
members of a class are [...] (b) In the second place, concentration upon the common 
qualities of individuals is at the expense of our knowledge of the individuals 
themselves. (Acton 1937: 3) 
I think these problems do not apply to a natural class. For these the shared attributes of the 
class are considerable enough, and one may of course make comparisons across classes even 
though these will not be as good as those that are members of the same class. To the second 
objection, I think it essential to see which qualities in the individual belong to it per se, and 
which belong per se to one of the higher genera. Seeing it as a species of a genus allows for 
explanations of attributes, by saying that the species has this attribute because it is a part of 
the genus. E.g. this isosceles has internal angles equal to two right angles, this being 
explained by it being a triangle. For a fuller defence of the concepts of genus and differentia 
see Cook Wilson 1926: 354-376. For the still critical reader, I ask you to be open-minded with 
my use of these concepts until the end of the thesis, and then consider if your critical remarks 
against the concepts still holds. 
One should also have in mind the somewhat archaic definitions of induction and 
deduction—induction being the inference from particulars (some A is B) to universals (all A 
is B), deduction being the inference from universals to particulars. These two terms will be 
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used meaning something like that throughout this thesis. I.e. by induction I mean any 
inference going from the less general to the more general
5
. By deduction I mean any inference 
going from a general premise, and inferring a logical consequent. To a certain degree one can 
understand the analogy as first an induction leading to C1, then a deduction to C2. But there is 
much more to be said about this type of argument. And as I will suggest, the universal 
principle that the analogy works through can be taken to be an assumed premise, and not a 
conclusion induced by the first part of the analogy. 
 
I. 2 The history of the concept of an expert, from presocratic 
thought to Aristotle 
 
The concept of an expertise (tšcnh) was not developed by Socrates or Plato, rather it is a 
concept which already at that time had been much discussed and thus was a well-established 
concept. In this section I will briefly relate the different meanings of the term as used in 
presocratic thought, in Plato, and in Aristotle. This will be but a very rough sketch, giving us 
a picture of the concept. For a more thorough presentation I recommend the first chapter of 
Roochnik 1996, and the introduction and chapter 1 of Angier 2010. 
The earliest meaning of tšcnh seems to have been to the carpenter (tšktwn), but by the 
time of Homer it also encompassed ship-building and smithing
6
. So already at that time every 
expertise had its separate goal that it worked to achieve. And it should be a beneficial goal, 
making the expertise useful. It also in a sense commands nature, e.g. in Prometheus Bound. It 
is a human power that stands in opposition to nature and chance. It also has a high degree of 
exactness, and in this respect especially geometry, being more developed at that time than 
arithmetic, was seen as the paradigm case of an expertise. Further the expert has a systematic 
grasp of his expertise, and regularly produces the goal. An expert is also thought to be one 
that can teach the expertise to others. And by being an authoritative expert, and being 
recognised as such, he can sell his services. Solon adds that an expertise can either be used for 
the good or for the bad
7
. 
                                               
5
 An exception here is for the term ‘Socratic induction’, where I follow the terminology of Robinson and the 
other commentators. 
6
 Cf. Angier 2010: 3. 
7 Cf. Roochnik 1996: 30-32. 
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To begin with it seems that medicine was a rather controversial expertise, based on the 
Hippocratic writings especially On Techne and On Ancient Medicine. It has a definite goal, 
viz. health, which is clearly of benefit. What was seen as questionable was if medicine was 
able to produce this goal. The doctor did not always succeed in healing the patient, and on the 
other side patients sometimes got well on their own. And the doctor would often refuse 
seriously ill patients. The argument then was that because of this medicine is not really an 
expertise. But, they responded, one cannot demand higher exactness than what is appropriate 
for the field. Medicine could give rules, but these were still only rules of thumb. There were 
in addition, at least if one considers the state of the medical profession at that time, a great 
number of incurable diseases. Roochnik argues, perhaps convincingly, that the case of 
medicine represents a considerably different type of expertise, which he calls techne2. 
Compared to geometry it falls short on many respects. Its subject matter is open to some 
change, it does not have strict rules, and its end is distinct from its function so that the doctor 
can perform his function yet fail to achieve health
8
. 
Rhetoric is likewise a controversial expertise. It is defended as being similar to 
medicine. E.g. Gorgias says that “the effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is 
comparable to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies.”9 For Gorgias rhetoric properly 
orders belief (doxa) in the soul, and since belief is the best one can aim for, rhetoric is an 
expertise. Isocrates’ view on rhetoric is slightly different. Roochnik argues that Isocrates 
thinks, though not so explicitly, that rhetoric like medicine is a techne2. The subject matter is 
not fixed and stable, so that the rhetorician must adopt his speech to the situation. Also it is 
teachable, but to become a good speaker also requires a good nature and intelligence – which 
rhetoric cannot teach. And also, there are good orators that have not been taught rhetoric. He 
thinks the education also makes the students into good men, but he does not claim to teach 
justice. And the teacher mainly teaches through being an example (par£deigma), exemplifying 
in practice the good man. 
Plato’s concept of expertise is like that of techne1, and the paradigm case seems to be 
geometry. Still, Plato uses a very wide range of experts in his analogies, and the doctor seems 
to be one of his favourites. What Plato adds is a division between expertise and mere knacks 
(™mpeir…an), the difference being that while the expertise aims for the real good, the knack 
only aims for the apparent good. It is not obvious if Plato himself accepts this division, but he 
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 Cf. Roochnik 1996: 52. 
9 Helen 14, quoted in Roochnik 1996: 72. 
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does make use of it at several places. The expert is definitely an honorary title for him, and 
the argument often aims to prove that some expert (the Homeric bard, the orator, the sophist, 
etc.) does not have a real expertise. Plato also frequently uses arguments presupposing that 
virtue and justice are expertise, but it is also controversial if Plato himself accepts this or only 
uses the argument in order to lead his opponent into a self-contradiction. 
Now Aristotle develops the concept of expertise considerably. While he says that logic 
and rhetoric are expertise, he largely thinks that all expertise are productive (poišsij). He 
separates out the virtues and justice, not calling these expertise as they are not productive but 
rather practical (pr©xij). And both of these are separated from the theoretical sciences 
(qewr…a) like geometry and physics. Thus he divided the expertise into three types, and only 
retained the word expertise for the productive crafts, e.g. medicine, carpentry, etc. 
More recently virtue-ethicists have attempted to revive the view that virtue is an 








II  Previous commentators on the structure of the 
expert-analogy 
 
For some reason there has been remarkably little written on the structure and validity of the 
expert-analogy. There has been no in-depth analysis of it in Aristotle, and most commentators 
simply assume that it is either a proportional analogy or a weak inductive argument. The main 
commentators on this type of argument in Plato and Xenophon are Robinson (1953), Santas 
(1979) and Vlastos (1991). More recently McPherran (2007) has proposed a somewhat new 
interpretation, inspired by Santas
10
. Let us first look at Robinson: 
By epagoge I mean an argument from one proposition, or from a set of coordinate 
propositions, either to another proposition superordinate to the premisses as the more 
universal is superordinate to the less universal and the particular, or to another 
proposition coordinate with the premisses, or first to a superordinate and thence to a 
coordinate proposition. ‘Women are weak and therefore men are weak’ is epagoge to a 
coordinate proposition. ‘Women are weak and therefore human beings are weak’ is 
epagoge to a superordinate. ‘Women are weak and therefore human beings are weak 
and therefore men are weak’ is epagoge first to a superordinate and thence to a 
coordinate. (Robinson 1953: 33) 
As Robinson remarks, this use of induction (™p£gwgh) differs from Aristotle’s usage of the 
term, in that Aristotle only calls the second of these three forms induction (e.g. Top. I. 12). I 
see no harm in following Robinson’s usage of the term, and indeed other commentators have 
done so as well, provided it is understood that one then means Socratic ™p£gwgh; however my 
argument in no way rests on this terminology. An alternative terminology, that Robinson also 
makes use of, is to call it ‘use of cases’. This is a much broader term, but confined to our 
present inquiry it does not seem to be misleading. This thesis is primarily a study of the 
expert-analogies, but these are a sub-class of Socratic induction, and are by far its most 
important type. 
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 It might also be worth briefly to mention Graham 1991 and Warren 1989. Graham says that Plato’s 
“arguments show a commitment to fixed presuppositions about the crafts which he exploits to his purposes. 
Indeed, we can glimpse in his presuppositions a certain order which amounts to a tacit anatomy of the crafts.” 
(Graham 1991: 11) This is in harmony with the interpretation that I will suggest, but Graham’s presentation 
does not really give a clear interpretation of the structure of the expert-analogy. Thus he is of little help to our 
present inquiry. Now Warren is mainly concerned with the use in the Republic, and concludes that “Plato does 
not employ a craft analogy in the Republic; he shows us that ruling is the supreme craft among crafts.” (Warren 
1989: 114) I find Warren’s conclusion quite peculiar, cf. my discussion of R. 444c-445b below. 
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However, keep in mind that Robinson includes not only analogies but also metaphors 
and images under this term. Later in his discussion of analogies he divides them up, but not so 
in his chapter on Socratic induction. Viz. the division between analogy on the one hand, on 
the other that of image (e„kèn), translated as image or simile or parable. Robinson says that an 
image is more vivid and persuasive, but that “it is something that cannot happen, a fairy tale.” 
(Robinson 1953: 208) Unlike the expert-analogies, these images are unreal, e.g. “the statue 
that perfectly resembles a man inside as well as without” (Robinson 1953: 208), and in 
addition they do not necessarily contain a universal which the two analogous cases embody, 
e.g. Plato’s cave. I will confine myself to discussing analogies, and will not be dealing with 
images. 
Robinson divides Socratic induction into three types. The first is inference from 
particular(s) to a universal. The second is inference from particular(s) to another particular, 
the universal being left implicit. The third is inference from particular(s) to another particular, 
with an explicit universal. Robinson thinks the second of these types is an analogy. “Analogy 
is the kind of epagoge that passes from case to case without mentioning the universal. The 
less evident the universal, the more likely we are to call it analogy and not epagoge.” 
(Robinson 1953: 207) I do not follow Robinson on this point, since I do not think that the 
form and validity of the argument is changed when the universal is left unstated. Occasionally 
it can give interpretative difficulties when it is left unstated, i.e. in interpreting what the 
universal is. Provided one has a correct apprehension of the universal, the argument should be 
just as strong independent of whether it is implicit or explicit. Thus I am interested in both the 
second and third type of Socratic induction, while I am not so interested in the first type as 
this is not an analogy but rather a type of inductive argument. 
Robinson thinks that the use of cases are both used to infer a proposition and to 
illustrate a proposition: “The use of cases to infer a proposition grades imperceptibly into the 
use of cases to illustrate a proposition; and between these two points there must be an interval 
where the case makes the proposition directly evident.” (Robinson 1953: 38) And again, “a 
line may be drawn within the continuum of the Socratic procedure from the purely inferential 
to the purely explanatory use of cases.” (Robinson 1953: 42) In contrast to this Vlastos thinks 
that it only illustrates – “exemplifying it, rather than prove it...” (Vlastos 1991: 268)11 And on 
the other extreme, Santas consistently treats the analogies as inferences (vide Santas 1979: 
                                               
11 Another supporter of this view is McCaskey 2006, see especially page 35. 
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138-147). I will argue against Vlastos that most of the analogies are inferences, and especially 
that the analogies from the expertise are inferences. 
On the form and validity of the analogies, Robinson does not have that much to say. 
He is of the opinion that Plato did not have a clear conception of induction, thus some of his 
inferences to superordinate propositions are based on probability, some on complete 
enumeration and some are intuitive induction, or rather they are usually based on a mixture of 
all three
12. Plato often use phrases like ‘by parity of reason’ (kat¦ tÕn aÙtÕn lÒgon), which 
makes it seem only probably. I.e. one is saying that if they follow the same rule, belong the 
same genus, have the same form, etc. then the conclusion follows. However this argument is 
viewed as too weak by Robinson. “There seems to be no clear case of the conception of 
epagoge as merely probable in the dialogues.” (Robinson 1953: 37) Similarly Plato often 
says, after reviewing a few cases, that ‘the same holds for the rest’. This points toward 
complete enumeration (though rather one of enumerating all the species under a genies than 
of every particular instance). And then there are analogies where it seems as if the cases 
simply point towards the universal without giving any proof. I agree with Robinson that Plato 
(and somewhat less so with Aristotle) did not separate clearly between these three kinds. But 
what I want to focus on is the inference that goes from one case to another, the analogy, and 
not the inference to the universal, and the analogy does not face the same problems. 
He first separates between two types of analogy: “(1) since this X is Y, that X is Y, (2) 
since this X is Y, that P is Q.” (Robinson 1953: 207) These two types correspond to what 
Brown calls predictive analogy and proportional analogy. In the first type the analogy is 
drawn between two objects or terms (X and Y), in the second the analogy is between the 
relation X to Y and the relation P to Q. Another interesting point that Robinson draws 
attention to is that the number of cases used does not affect the validity of the analogy: 
Analogy seems to be essentially an argument from a single case to a single case. 
However many cases are available, the argument, if it is an analogy, chooses only one 
of them, or at any rate treats all that it takes as being for the purpose of the argument a 
single case. It is essentially not perfect epagoge; for that ascends to the universal. It is 
essentially not probable epagoge from a plurality of cases either; for it professes to be 
intuitive in character, to see into one thing by an insight obtained on another. 
(Robinson 1953: 207) 
                                               
12 Cf. Robinson 1953: 35-38. 
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I think Vlastos should be interpreted to be saying basically the same thing, viz. that it does not 
rely on the number of cases and thus is not a probable inference, with the exception 
mentioned above that Vlastos does not think of it as an inference and therefore that the cases 
plays no role in validating the analogy. He calls it an intuitive induction, and says that ‘the 
truth of the conclusion is built into the meaning of its critical term “master of a craft”’. 
(Vlastos 1991: 268) The conclusion is not arrived at from the number of cases cited, and one 
example should be enough to exemplify the critical term. At the same time, it is not 
something that can be empirically confirmed or falsified. The argument is based on a proper 
understanding of a genus, such that there cannot be a species of that genus without this 
attribute. E.g. “anyone who claims to be a master of a given craft but does not possess 
relevant knowledge superior to that of a master of some other craft or of no craft at all would 
be ipso dicto disqualified as a fake.” (Vlastos 1991: 268) Vlastos’ discussion is however very 
brief, and he only discusses in detail the type of Socratic induction that is not an analogy, 
where one infers from cases to a superordinate universal. Regarding the type going from one 
case to another coordinate case, where the universal is left implicit, he says that “what we 
have here is straightforward argument by analogy: from some cases of C we argue by analogy 
to a further case of C.” (Vlastos 1991: 268) This description of an analogy looks like what I 
want to defend, where one argues from one species of a genus to another species of the same 
genus. But the passage does not admit us to say anything further than that. For the type where 
the universal is explicit, he is equally abrupt: “here we go by epagoge to the general statement 
about all cases of C and then infer by syllogism that this would be true of this or that case of 
C.” (Vlastos 1991: 268) Here he admits that the second stage of this, the syllogism, is an 
inference. But Vlastos is then faced with several problems. How is this third type related to 
the analogical type? Vlastos gives no answer to this. And why does one have to presume that 
the cases works as an intuitive induction, instead of simply taking the universal as a stated 
premise which first are exemplified by the cases – which is my proposal. 
Next let us deal with the interpretation that Santas gives, where it is a kind of probable 
induction. As a result of this he thinks an increase of the number of cases increases the 
strength (or perhaps probability) of the analogy. Because he assumes that it is an inductive 
argument he does not check the validity and soundness of the argument, but instead its 
strength. 
The strength of an inductive argument depends on several factors, such as the number 
of instances from which the conclusion is drawn, the similarities and dissimilarities 
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among these instances, the known similarities between these instances and the 
instances in the conclusion, the known relations, if any, among the properties S and P. 
(Santas 1979: 312) 
Thus in contrast with Vlastos and Robinson, with their interpretation based more on intuitive 
induction, Santas thinks that the number of instances inferred from is of great importance. 
E.g. “it has the form of an argument by analogy, and in so far as it proceeds from only one 
instance it is weak.” (Santas 1979: 146) In spite of this, Santas thinks both the analogies that 
he discusses (La. 184d-185a and Cri. 47a-48a) are strong. Yet it is not obvious why Santas 
still think they are strong arguments given his interpretation. Let us deal with these two 
analogies in turn. 
The argument in La. 184d-185a is preceded by two short speeches, one by the general 
Nicias and the other by the general Laches. The problem is whether fighting in armour is a 
subject that young men should be taught or not. Nicias argues that it should be, Laches argues 
that it should not. Lysimachus then proposes that the problem should be solved by Socrates 
‘casting his vote’ on one of them. Lysimachus and Melesias, who are following the discussion 
between Nicias and Laches, will then accept the position that Socrates support, viz. they will 
follow the majority. Socrates then gives an argument that disproves this proposal by 
Lysimachus. Socrates first gives the following premise (which Melesias accepts), presenting a 
case of an expert: 
Socrates: Suppose there should be a council to decide whether your son ought to 
practice a particular kind of gymnastic exercise, would you be persuaded by 
the greater number or by whoever has been educated and exercised under a 
good trainer? 
Melesias: Probably by the latter, Socrates. (La. 185e) 
After this Socrates makes the superordinate principle explicit. “So I think it is by knowledge 
that one ought to make decisions, if one is to make them well, and not by majority rule.” (La. 
185e) Then the conclusion of the analogy is drawn, namely that one should follow the expert 
on the issue they are debating (armed combat), and not the majority. The dialogue then moves 
on to discussing if any of the present is an expert on the issue; and if no one of them are then 
who is an expert on it. 
I find Santas’ analysis of this argument to be rather peculiar. He ignores the 
superordinate principle, and he also ignores that both the trainer and the expert on armed 
combat are experts. Instead he constructs a premise, based on the succeeding discussion in 
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185b-e and 189e-190e: “The consultation as to whether our sons should learn fighting in 
armour is consultation about means to ends.” (Santas 1979: 140) If our argument had 
followed the discussion of means and ends particularly in 189e-190e, I concede that it would 
be possible to make this procedure. But since Santas draws this premise from a succeeding 
discussion it is highly questionable. On this reading Socrates conclusion will at first be 
invalid, as it is missing a necessary premise. But there is no textual basis for saying that the 
conclusion in 185e should be taken to be unproven at this point. Especially since the argument 
can be interpreted as perfectly valid and sound without making use of Santas’ questionable 
premise. Let us look closer at the structure that Santas proposes for analogical arguments: 
P1 a, b, c, each is known (observed) to have S and P 
P2 d is an S 
C1 Therefore, (Probably) d is P. (Santas 1979: 140) 
Under this structure, a, b, c, (etc.) are the cases inferred from, and d is the case inferred to. S 
and P are attributes. Santas thinks this is the structure of all analogical arguments, while the 
words in the parentheses modify this structure to be an inductive analogy. I can only 
speculate, but it might be argued that this structure is the reason why Santas interprets this 
argument so peculiarly. With this structure an analogical argument must be an inference 
between two things having many similar attributes, but where one of them is known to also 
have an additional attribute. Understood this way an analogy is a kind of induction, but where 
the importance is not so much the number of cases cited as the number of similar attributes 
shared. Cf. “the similarities between the two cases are considerable, and this strengthens the 
argument [...]” (Santas 1979: 140-1) As there is no necessary connection between having the 
shared attributes and in addition having another attribute in common, this argument would at 
best be probable. If it is accidental that they share the same attributes, one cannot from that 
infer with necessity that they also will share other attributes. However, if it is known that 
having an attribute, or being a certain thing, necessarily entails having an additional attribute 
– then the analogy would be deductive. There would be a necessary connection between the 
two, thus validating the inference. The proposed structure of analogical arguments that I 
propose below is in many ways similar to the structure that Santas proposed, but with one 
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essential difference. If S is taken not to be an attribute, but rather the genus of a to d, and if 
being a part of S necessarily entails having P, one ends up with a valid deductive argument
13
. 
Using this structure let us again look at the argument from La. 184d-185a. Now a is 
the gymnastic trainer, d is the expert on armed combat, S is being an expert, and P is that one 
should be persuaded by the expert and not the majority. The argument is then that 1) if one 
should be persuaded by the gymnastic trainer on issues within his expertise (because he is an 
expert), and 2) if there is an expert on armed combat, then 3) one should be persuaded by the 
expert on armed combat on issues of armed combat rather than by the majority. This is a 
perfectly straightforward interpretation, adding nothing to what is said in 184d-185a, and 
giving a deductively valid conclusion. This interpretation is further strengthened by the 
succeeding question that Socrates raises, namely who among us (if any) is the expert on 
armed combat. This would be the natural question to ask if the preceding argument had been 
the one I am suggesting. 
Next let us look at Santas’ discussion of Cri. 47a-48a. Preceding Socrates argument, 
Crito argues that if Socrates refuses to escape from prison, then the public opinion would be 
that he did not escape because of cowardice and unmanliness in himself and his companions. 
And this would be contrary to the good. Socrates then intends to disprove Crito’s argument, 
by showing that the good is not to be concerned with the opinion of the majority. “Should a 
man professionally engaged in physical training pay attention to the praise and blame and 
opinion of any man, or to those of one man only, namely a doctor or trainer?” (Cri. 47a-b) 
Crito accepts that one should follow the doctor and trainer, and Socrates then makes Crito 
accept a few implications of this, most importantly that if one were to follow the opinion of 
the many in this respect, it would harm one’s body. And further, that a life is not worth living 
if one’s body is in a poor state. Then, that the part concerned with justice and injustice is even 
more important than the body, and if that part is in a poor state then one’s life would certainly 
not be worth living. Socrates then concludes saying: “we should not then think so much of 
what the majority will say about us, but what he will say who understands justice and 
injustice [...]” (Cri. 48ab) 
Again Santas adds too much of Plato’s doctrine into his interpretation. Remembering 
his structure of an analogy presented above, he thinks he finds the following attribute P1(a) 
shared between on the one hand the doctor and trainer and on the other the expert on justice: 
                                               
13 McPherran also thinks this argument is a deduction, but he still accepts most parts of Santas’ interpretation. 
The only thing he changes from Santas’ interpretation is that he exchanges the particular premise P1 with a 
universal premise. Thus, my criticism of Santas holds equally well against McPherran. 
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“it takes experience and knowledge to determine which actions promote virtue in the psyche 
and which destroy vice, i.e. which actions benefit the psyche and which harm it.” (Santas 
1979: 146) To this he adds that one must presuppose the analogy between the health of the 
body and the health of the soul, e.g. from Grg. 464a-466a. But our argument does not even 
mention the soul, except implicitly when referring to the matters concerning justice and 
injustice. Nor does he say that it takes experience and knowledge to determine which actions 
promote virtue. What he does say is that if there is an expert on matters pertaining to justice 
and injustice, then we should follow him rather than the majority. Then in his conclusion, 
Santas does not add the second part of the argument, where he concludes that following the 
majority in matters of justice and injustice makes it not worth to be living. 
I think it a much better interpretation to also read this argument as a deductive 
analogy. 1) In matters of physical training one should follow the expert on the subject, the 
doctor and trainer, and not that of the majority. 2) and if there is an expert on the just and 
unjust, 3) then in matters of the just and unjust one should follow the expert on the just and 
unjust, and not the majority. Then, from 47e to 48a a second argument is presented. 1) In 
matters of physical training if we follow the opinion of the majority rather than the expert (the 
doctor and trainer), it will ruin our body and make life unliveable. 2) The part concerned with 
justice and injustice is more valuable than the body. 3) Thus in matters of virtue and vice if 
we follow the opinion of the majority rather than the expert, it will ruin the part concerned 
with justice and injustice, and make life unliveable. In this manner Socrates disproves the 
argument of Crito. 
Santas says that the argument “appears to be a very strong argument because the 
connection between (a) and (b) in P1 is not simply conjunction but a much stronger 
connection [...] If we grant P1(b) on the basis of P1(a), it appears that by parity of reasoning 
we should grant C1(b) on the basis of P2(a).” (Santas 1979: 146) This is the closest  
formulation of Santas explaining why the analogy is strong, but it is hardly satisfactory. As 
we saw, the premise that he reads into the text, P1(a), is not there and is not necessary for the 
argument. In contrast what actually ties the attribute (b), that one should follow the expert on 
the subject rather than the majority, together with the both the doctor and the expert on 
justice, is precisely that both are said to be experts. And a necessary attribute of being an 
expert is that people should follow him rather than a non-expert. 
Santas also discuss the analogy in Grg. 460a-c, only he does not think it is an analogy. 
The argument begins with the following premise: “If you make someone an orator, it’s 
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necessary for him to know what’s just and what’s unjust [...]” (460a) Then it is argued that the 
man who has learned carpentry, or music, or medicine, or other expertise is a carpenter etc. 
And thus, he who has learned the just is a just man, and a just man does just things. So the 
conclusion is that an orator is necessarily just and will never do injustice. 
The interpretation that Santas presents is threefold. First there is an inductive 
generalization from the carpenter, musician and doctor to the universal, viz. that every expert 
is named after the subject one has learned. The second part of the argument is deductive, 
using the universal just proved together with the premise that justice is an expertise, inferring 
that he who has learnt justice is a just man. And third, there is a modus ponens. If the orator 
(just man) is necessarily just and of necessity wishes to do just things, then the just man will 
never do injustice. It could be argued that the argument is better described as being an 
analogy followed by a modus ponens. It depends on whether one thinks Socrates in 460b, 
where he gives the universal, is making the universal implied in the cases explicit, or whether 
a one thinks as Santas that the three cases given is supposed to prove the universal. Now I 
agree with Santas that the three cases and the universal are not tautologies
14
. But at the same 
time it seems to be a necessary part of what it is to be an expert
15
. E.g. when graduating from 
medical school it follows necessarily that one can call oneself a doctor. That is something that 
is not obvious, e.g. a child does not have to comprehend that it is necessary to have graduated 
from medical school to be a doctor. At the same time, it is a premise that can be taken for 
granted in normal conversation. Now it is possible that Plato thought the three cases he cited 
proved the universal, and one could say as Robinson that Plato had a confused concept of 
induction. Yet as it is not necessary to interpret the passage in this way, and as I judge it to be 
a more benevolent reading if Plato merely stated the universal as a premise, I find my reading 
to be preferable. 
The most recent commentator is McPherran, who seems to think that there are many 
different types of Socratic induction. However, he wants to emphasis one particular type that 
he thinks has previously been underestimated, namely probable induction. He defines 
probable induction as a “generalization employing a survey of coordinate cases involving 
intuition of the universal (but not yielding certainty, as in conception (A) of intuition of the 
universal).” (McPherran 2007: 363) He also gives an example of this type of probable 
induction: if one were to check the price of gasoline in Franklin County at “six scattered 
                                               
14
 Cf. Santas 1979: 152. 
15 Cf. McPherran 2007: 356, which agrees that this argument “is not actually inductive”. 
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filling stations (including a discount station)” (McPherran 2007: 361), and if one found the 
price in all cases to be slightly higher than $2 a gallon, then would could with a high grade of 
probability conclude that “gasoline prices are over $2.00 a gallon in Franklin County.” (Ibid.) 
The probability of the conclusion is strengthened the more representative the selection of 
cases is, and the more one can refer to other statistical laws, e.g. if the prices between the 
various filling stations is known to usually vary within a few cents of each other. In contrast 
to Santas’ view, where the probability of an analogy depended on the number of shared 
attributes, McPherran thinks the probability depends mainly on how representative the 
selection of cases is. E.g. if one is doing a survey on consumer habits, but only interviews 
people from the same part of the city, of roughly the same age, of the same sex, and the same 
religion – the selection will not be representative for the whole city. In the same way, when 
giving cases of experts one should give one theoretical, one practical, one craft, etc. Thus the 
more representative selection one gives, and if one in addition can cite any statistical laws, 
this will give a highly probable argument. But while this method may have its uses in the field 
of statistics, it can hardly be said to be applicable as a philosophical method. However, one 
should not be too hasty before we have looked at the Socratic arguments that he cites in 
support of his theory.  
There is also some variance between his article from 2007 and the one from 2011. 
While in the 2007-article the emphasis is on arguing against Vlastos (and in a lesser degree 
Robinson), in the 2011-article the emphasis is on contrasting his view to that of Santas. In the 
more recent article, the conclusion is given that “the preceding arguments [...] validate the 
1979 insight of Santas that marked an important correction to the 1953 work of Robinson on 
epagōgē.” (McPherran 2011: 69) In the older article McPherran treats his interpretation as 
more seperate from Santas’. But especially in the more recent article McPherran criticises 
some interpretations of Santas. 
McPherran interprets Cri. 46b-48b quite differently from Santas
16
. He thinks that it is 
not an analogy but rather a complete enumeration. He bases this interpretation solely on the 
following lines: 
So with other matters, not to enumerate them all, and certainly with actions just and 
unjust, shameful and beautiful, good and bad, about which we are now deliberating 
[...](47c8-11) 
                                               
16 Cf. the discussion of Santas’ interpretation above. 
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In the lines that McPherran quotes, Socrates clarifies the superordinate principle, making it 
clear that also justice falls under the principle. But I fail to see in this line any enumeration of 
cases, either complete or incomplete. He simply says that it holds for all experts, but does not 
give any indication that he thereby has checked every possible type of expert. He states the 
universal characteristic of experts, but this is something very different from enumerating 
every instance of it. Just as to say that ‘all the balls in this basket is red’ is something quite 
different from taking all the balls out of the basket and checking that each of them are red. 
What he says is that one should follow the opinion of the expert as such (not just the trainer 
and doctor), and that this also applies to the just and unjust (the shameful and beautiful, the 
good and bad, are simply synonyms for the just and unjust here). So again I fail to see any 
enumeration of cases said to be representative, and nothing at all of it looks like the statistical-
probabilistic type of argument presented above. 
McPherran refers to a further 5 arguments which he thinks are typical instances of 
probabilistic induction. I can grant to him that Chrm. 159b-60d and 167c-68b are instances of 
probabilistic reasoning. I think Euthphr. 7a6-8a8 is simply guilty of a logical fallacy, viz. the 
fallacy of false dichotomy. I don’t think La. 192b9-93d8 and Mem. 1.2.9 are instances of 
probabilistic reasoning. 
Chrm. 159b-60d presents a counter-argument to Charmides’ proposed definition of 
temperance as a sort of quietness. Socrates says that in writing, reading, playing the lyre, 
wrestling, boxing, running, pancration, running, jumping, and all the movements of the body, 
the admirable is to do these quickly and not slowly
17
. And since temperance is admirable, in 
matters of the body temperance will be quickness, not quietness. And in learning, teaching, 
recalling, remembering, shrewdness, understanding, operations of thought, making plans, the 
admirable is to do these quickly and not slowly. So both in matters of the soul and of the 
body, the admirable is to do these quickly and not slowly. Then he concludes, temperance is 
rather quickness than quietness, and Charmides’ proposed definition has been refuted. 
McPherran takes note of what is said in the conclusion, namely that “either no quiet actions in 
life appear to be more admirable than the swift and strong ones, or very few.” (Chrm. 160c) 
Now this appears to be a very different argument from the expert-analogies. All one is given 
is various cases, covering a reasonably wide area, with all of these having the attribute that it 
is more admirable to do them quickly than quietly. But there is no explanation why the quick, 
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 The argument uses the equivocity of ¹sucikÒj, which means both ‘quiet’ and ‘slow’. 
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per se, should be better than the quiet. And thus I am willing to accept McPherrans 
interpretation that this one argument is a probable induction. 
Chrm. 167c-68b gives a counter-argument to a proposal from Charmides that 
temperance is a science both of other sciences and of itself (166c). But there is no vision of 
vision, no hearing of hearing, and none of the other senses sense itself and the other senses. 
Further there is no desire of desire, no wish for wish, no love of love itself, no fear of fear 
itself, and no opinion of itself. The implicit universal is that “none of the things that are is of a 
nature to have its faculty (dunamis) relative to itself (pros heauto).” (Dancy 2004: 102-3, 
cited in McPherran 2007: 363) So the conclusion is that there cannot be a science of itself and 
other sciences. Again, McPherran takes note of this sentence, which modifies the conclusion 
and indicates that the result in uncertain: “However, we ought not yet to state categorically 
that there is not, but still go on investigating whether there is.” (168a) I think it is quite clear 
that the premises does not validate a universal conclusion. There is nothing connecting these 
faculties with the sciences (™pist»mh), and thus the implicit universal that would validate the 
conclusion, does not follow from the premises. I agree with McPherran that this argument is 
just a probable induction, and is a rather poor argument. 
McPherran cites Euthphr. 7a6-8a8 as an example of a probabilistic inductive 
argument, yet he does not give a discussion of it. The argument begins with the premise that 
the gods are in discord, and are angry at each other. Now if one were to differ about numbers 
one would count them and resolve the difference. And the same about the larger and smaller, 
one would measure them and resolve the difference. And the same about the heavier and 
lighter, one would weigh them and resolve the difference. But on the just and unjust, the 
beautiful and ugly, the good and bad, if one differs on these one becomes angry at each other. 
The conclusion is then that the gods differ on what is the just and unjust, the beautiful and 
ugly, the good and bad. The weak spot in the argument is that Socrates has not proven that 
there are no other subjects than these that are such that if one differs on them one becomes 
angry with each other. In other words, the cases he cites does not seem to be exclusive, and 
thus the argument is guilty of the fallacy of false dichotomy. Now this is my interpretation of 
the argument. I am not sure how McPherran supposes to interpret this argument as a 
probabilistic argument. Arguably it is a poor argument, but it is not poor because the cases 
Socrates cites are not numerous and representative enough. He could cite many more cases 
from widely different fields, all showing that when people differ one does not become angry 
at each other, but the argument would still be guilty of the logical fallacy. Only if the 
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dichotomy is proved to be correct can one argue that because it is not the first alternative, then 
it necessarily has to be the second. 
La. 192b9-93d8 is another example that McPherran cites yet does not discuss. Laches 
propose that courage “is a sort of endurance of the soul” (192c), and Socrates intends to show 
that this definition will not do. Now endurance accompanied by wisdom is a fine think, but if 
accompanied by folly is harmful. Since courage is fine, the definition is restated as wise 
endurance of the soul. Now I don’t think it is this part of the argument that McPherran has in 
mind, as this seems be a straightforward deductive argument. And here the dichotomy is 
valid, as wisdom is the contrary of folly. Then Socrates moves on to inquiring what kind of 
wise endurance the courageous man possesses. Now it is not that of the money-maker who 
endures spending his money knowing that he thus in the end will make more. It is not that of 
the doctor who endures refusing the patient from eating and drinking, knowing that this will 
benefit the patient’s health. And then he compares the soldier who knows his side has the 
advantage and therefore endures with the soldier on the opposite side of the battle who 
endures without this knowledge – and Laches thinks the second man without knowledge is the 
more courageous. And the same with the cavalry rider who knows horsemanship and the one 
who does not, Laches thinks the one who does not know it the more courageous. And the 
same with him who knows slinging or archery compared to the one who does not. And in 
general the one without knowledge is braver. Now those run greater risks and endure more 
foolishly than those who have knowledge, and thus courage has been found to be foolish 
endurance, not wise endurance. Again I fail to see the supposed probable induction. The 
adding of the case of the cavalry rider etc. does not seem to be there in order to increase the 
probability. Rather the cases cited lead Laches further and further towards the absurd, as they 
exhibit a greater and greater degree of folly.  McPherran might be taking the cases to be 
proving the universal, viz. that the one without knowledge is always braver, but it rather 
seems to point out something about how Laches comprehends the concept of courage. In 
either way it does not seem to be a very good argument, as it does not prove anything about 
courage per se. All the argument proves is that Laches conception of courage is at odds with 
the definition that he proposed. 
Mem. 1.2.9 is the last example that McPherran gives of a probabilistic induction, but 
the example looks like the standard expert-analogy: 
But, said his accuser, he taught his companions to despise the established laws by 
insisting on the folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none would choose a 
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pilot or builder or flautist by lot, nor any other craftsman for work in which mistakes 
are far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft. 
His reason for thinking this is a probabilistic argument is that “one can imagine a counter-
example to its claim, namely, the existence of a craft whose expertise is sufficiently difficult 
to test for (say, the craft of divination) that it is better to leave the choice of its best 
practitioner to the lot...” (McPherran 2007: 363) But the text nowhere mentions any test being 
done. The superordinate principle is instead that one ought to choose the one with expert 
knowledge, instead of choosing it by lot. The conclusion then follows from the premises if the 
reason why pilots etc. should not be chosen by lot is because they are experts, and if there is 
such a thing as an expert statesman. Exactly how one is to recognize this expert is not 
mentioned, and this is not required for the conclusion. I think this argument is a typical 
analogy that is used frequently by Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle. Its foundation is the 
conception of an expert, rather than the number of cases cited and how representative these 
are for the group. Thus it is an expert-analogy, and not as McPherran suggests a probable 
induction. 
As I said above, I can accept McPherran’s claim that Plato have a few probabilistic 
arguments. What I cannot accept is his claim that most epagogic arguments are probabilistic: 
“This means, of course, that—contrary to Robinson’s account of epagōgē as (A) intuiting the 
universal where this yields certainty—Socrates saw such intuitions of a universal as standing 
in need of corroboration through a sampling of cases and as only providing probable results.” 
(McPherran 2007: 362) The examples that McPherran discusses does not in any way warrant 
such a broad conclusion. At best one can say that there are a few weak arguments to be found, 
where the conclusion can only be said to hold by a probability. But these passages should be 
seen as exceptions, and that Socrates usually gave better arguments. What one should not do, 
though McPherran seems to be doing it, is to reinterpret the form and validity of all Socrates’ 
arguments, based on picking out the weakest arguments and then inferring that the other 
arguments are just as weak. It is of course not impossible that McPherran’s interpretation is 
correct; however it has weak textual support and is an uncommonly malevolent reading. 
My discussion will focus on the analogical epagogic arguments, viz. the expert 
analogies, rather than the arguments of Robinson’s type 1 where one does not infer to a 
particular. For one, the analogies are quite dominant. Secondly, they usually present the more 
interesting arguments; viz. arguments that play a more central role in the dialogues. As Santas 
puts it, “it is these applications that make his remarks about the science-crafts philosophically 
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interesting.” (Santas 1979: 147) As will be seen, my interpretation is neither as the statistical 
induction that only yields a probable inference pace McPherran and the more moderate 
Santas, nor the interpretation as an intuitive induction where it is not an inference at all pace 
Vlastos and the more moderate Robinson. I agree with the one side that it is an inference, and 
I agree with the other side that the premises are a result from concept-analysis rather than 
collection of data. Before I present my interpretation of the structure of the expert-analogies, I 
would like to look at a different type of argument which I will argue is of the same logical 




III Biological homology 
 
In comparative biology there is a method of inference called homology. Somewhat 
confusingly, this term is used both for the inference from one species (or a part of a species) 
to another as well as the equivalent attributes that is inferred. As the second usage, it can be 
defined as “equivalence or sameness of organismic parts due to common ancestry.” (Sluys 
1996: 145) This is separated from analogy, where the sameness is not due to common 
ancestry. The most interesting form of it is the supraspecific, which is a “correspondence 
between characters of different species or higher taxa.” (Sluys 1996: 146) Richard Owen18 
defines homology as “the same organ in different animals under every variety of form and 
function.” (Owen 1843: 379) 
Here is an example of an homology in the second sense, from Darwin’s On the Origin 
of Species: 
What can be more curious than that the hand of a man, formed for grasping, that of a 
mole for digging, the leg of a horse, the paddle of the porpoise, and the wing of the 
bat, should all be constructed on the same pattern, and should include the same bones, 
in the same relative positions? Geoffroy St. Hilaire has insisted strongly on the high 
importance of relative connexion in homologous organs: the parts may change to 
almost any extent in form and size, and yet they always remain connected together in 
the same order. (Darwin 1859/2005: 572) 
                                               
18 Richard Owen was also a great admirer of Aristotle, cf. Lennox 2010: 351. 
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Without the premise that there’s a superordinate principle, common ancestry through 
evolution, these facts are curious. And it would certainly be impossible to infer from the bone 
structure of one species of animal to that of another, unless one assumes this principle, such 
that they in one sense are equivalent. The bone structures are identical as to order and number, 
because they are fundamentally the same bone structure tracing back to a common ancestor. 
If one assumes the principle of common ancestry between two species, one can infer 
from the bone structure of a species that one has studied, to a species that one has not studied. 
Thus one could make a valid inference from the leg of the horse, for instance how bone X 
connects with bone Y, to a conclusion that also in the leg of the cow bone X connects with 
bone Y. This analogy is supported by the two species being connected through common 
ancestry, and by the fact that the order and number of the bone structures within this 
taxonomic rank. Now a day it is however broad agreement that homology has limited use, and 
long gone are the days when one could reconstruct a whole animal from the smallest remnant  
of a bone. 
The concept of homology was created in the beginning of the 19
th
 century, however 
“Russell claims to find the idea of homology and even, implicitly, the distinction between 
homology and analogy in the Historia Animalium and De Partibus Animalium of Aristotle.” 
(Panchen 1992: 63) Russell refers to PA I 4, 644a16-23, and says it “show that Aristotle had 
some conception of homology as distinct from analogy. He did not, however, develop the 
idea.” (Russell 1916: 9) Further below he says that “Aristotle took much more interest in 
analogies, in organs of similar function, than in homologies. He did recognise the existence of 
homologies, but rather malgré lui, because the facts forced it upon him.” (Russell 1916: 10) 
Balme also finds a concept of homology in Aristole: “the concepts of ¢nalog…a and Øperoc» 
proved useful to Aristotle, and led to the modern concept of homology;” (Balme 1962; 89) 
And in another article Balme refers to the same passage as Russell: “so in  PA I 4 Aristotle 
explains that between genera the comparison is analogical (feathers: scales: hair), while 
between species it is a comparison of degree or ‘the more or less’ (roughly what we call 
homology).” (Balme 1975: 185) This stands somewhat in contrast to Lloyd, who says that 
“Aristotle has, to be sure, no equivalent to the technical distinction between homology and 
analogy, between parts that are morphologically and genetically similar, and those that merely 
serve a similar function.” (Lloyd 1996: 152) However, while discussing Aristotle’s and 
Theophrastus’ comments on Emp. fr. 68, which argues that milk is putrefied blood, he says 
that “the fragment may be said to contain the first attempt to use something resembling the 
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modern principle of homology to relate the parts of different species of living beings.” (Lloyd 
1966: 336) Balme argues that Aristotle had a concept of homology based on morphologically 
similar parts: “Aristotle based his homologies on common function, not on any theory of 
common descent, still less on evolution from a common ancestor [...] He recognizes them 
chiefly by morphology [...]” (Balme 1992: 120) I think there are strong indications that 
Aristotle had some form of method of homology, but that this method did not have the strong 
separation from analogy that it has today. And most certainly he did not have the explanation 
of this homology, that of common ancestry. But my thesis does not depend on Aristotle 
having a modern conception of homology. What it does depend on is his division of identity 
into three parts as made in PA 645b 26ff. and HA I. 486a14-487a10, viz. that of specific, 
generic and analogical. I will use this division later on while discussing the theoretical basis 
for the expert-analogies. Balme identifies the generic identity with homology
19
, while the 
analogical identity corresponds to the biological concept of analogy viz. where there is no 












                                               
19 Cf. Balme 1992: 120. 
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IV An interpretation of Socratic analogies 
 
At present I will argue that the Socratic analogies work much the same way as the biological 
homologies. It is an inference from one or more experts to another expert. The superordinate 
principle that validates the inference is that they are experts, together with the proposition that 
certain attributes are necessarily possessed by any expert. Thus, they will have the following 
form, where the second premise is usually left implicit. 
P1) Technē X has the attribute a. 
P2) Every technē has the attribute a. 
P3) Y is a technē. 
C) Y has the attribute a. 
Or possibly it would be better to present it like this, only having two premisses. Again, the 
second premise is usually left implicit: 
P1) T1 has A because it is an expertise 
P2) T2 is an expertise 
C) T2 has A 
Vlastos is correct in his view that the conclusion is built into the critical term, and this critical 
term is that of the expert. He is wrong when he thinks the Socratic analogies are intuitive 
inductions, i.e. that they only exemplify and do not prove. In the valid, though not sound, 
argument that I cited above from Men. 90c-91b, the conclusion is inferred, and what is more, 
it is not something evident given an understanding of the expert. Even though the conclusion 
is built into the term, it is not a mere restatement of the definition. A definition of the expert 
could be a person having special knowledge/skill of a topic, and from this definition and other 
propositions one could perhaps arrive at these various attributes of the expert. But even then, 
they would have to be derived – precisely how Plato would derive them is a bit uncertain, as 
these presuppositions about the expert are put forth by Socrates and accepted by his 
interlocutors. But I do not think they are ever proved by him by empirical support, nor that 
they “might be falsified by experience” (Vlastos 1991: 268), because I argue that they are 
inferences. It does not necessarily follow that any inference can be falsified by experience. 
The particular experts that is inferred from and inferred to are different types of 
expertise. They can be seen as taxonomic ranks, the particular cases as the shoemaker and the 
captain is on the rank beneath that of an expert. Thus the captain etc. is the species, expert the 
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genus. This division into ranks could also sound like Plato’s method of division (dia…resij) in 
e.g. Sophist and Statesman, however this type of analogy is a fundamentally different method 
from that of division. This is exemplified below in the discussion of Grg. 464a-465e. 
Because of this taxonomic relation the Socratic analogies are quite strong, since the 
analogies are not based on mere similarity. The superordinate principle makes them, qua 
experts, equivalent. One is talking about the same thing, only that the expertise which one 
infers from is clearer, better known, easier available, etc. to us than the one being inferred to. 
The structure of this type of analogy is not limited to the expert-analogy. The same 
form of argument is I think applicable in many circumstances, provided one generalizes the 
structure. Exchanging the variable G, for genus, for the mention of expertise above, one 
arrives at a structure like this: 
P1) G1 has C in virtue of belonging to G 
P2) G2 belongs to G 
C) G2 has C 
It is clear that the genus works as a middle term does in a syllogism, thus connecting the term 
B with the attribute C. Further the terms are predicated univocally as required for a valid 
syllogism, thus avoiding falling into a metaphor and a fallacious inference. It is however far 
from being a syllogism, as it makes use of 4 terms instead of the 3 that a syllogism uses. Still, 
it is a form of deductive argument. 
Thus one could use this structure to formalize e.g. a homological argument. The 
premises would however be vastly different. In an expert-analogy the premises are the result 
of concept-analysis. They are general, and attribute something to a species. The truth of the 
premises depends solely on having the right conception of the concept. In biology one 
performs empirical research, using scientific instruments one observes certain features, and 
these are then gathered under a concept. However, how the premisses are attained is irrelevant 
for the structure and validity of the inference, provided that the premises are true and that the 







V The theoretical basis for the expert-analogies 
 
Thus far we have confined our discussion to the application of the expert-analogies in Plato’s 
dialogues, and to the main interpreters of this practical use of the method. In the previous 
chapter I presented my alternative interpretation, and illustrated it by comparing it to the 
method of homology. In the present chapter I will deal with the theoretical discussions of this 
kind of method found in Plato and Aristotle. This will elucidate my interpretation of the 
expert-analogies, and situate it among the other methods of inference. And most importantly, 
it will give us a justification of the analogies, i.e. it will give a reason why this form of 
analogy is valid (though not necessarily sound). 
 
V. 1 Plato’s discussion of analogies 
 
I do not think it possible to present Plato’s discussion of analogies much better than Robinson 
does in chapter 12 of his Plato’s Earlier Dialectic. And even his discussion is remarkably 
short, and to a certain degree speculative. 
In contrast to the selfconscious discussions of hypothetical method, which is not much 
used in the dialogue, analogy and imagery, which are frequent, receive very little 
discussion. Moreover—a further accenting of the incoherence—what is said about 
them is mostly against them. (Robinson 1953: 202) 
This is a fair summary of the position. Still, I think it of value to rephrase and repeat the 
observations that Robinson makes. A rather speculative attempt at connecting Plato’s use of 
analogies with his epistemology is suggested by him. It is remarked by Robinson that Plato‘s 
usage of the word analogy (¢nalog…a), as well as the adjectival form and phrases related to 
the word, only refers to mathematical proportion. He emphasises the Pythagorean aspects of 
Plato, namely the belief that geometrical analogies, viz. proportions (¢nalog…a), are frequent 
and should be searched for in reality. The most relevant dialogue for this reading is the 
Timaeus, and Robinson refers to 31C: “the finest bonds is that which makes itself and the 
things it binds as much one as possible, and this is most finely achieved by proportion.” And 
also Phlb. 16D: “We ought always to assume and search for one form concerning everything 
on each occasion, for we shall find it there.”20 Now there is the problem with using the 
                                               
20 Both translations are from Robinson 1953: 209-210. 
28 
 
Timaeus as a justification for the use of analogies, as the dialogue itself is centred on the 
imagery (I think it more fitting to call it so than an analogy) of the divine craftsman. And 
there is the added difficulty that Plato’s use of ¢nalog…a cannot be translated with analogy, as 
noted above. However, Robinson comments on this: 
We may note in passing, however, that it means something closely related, and 
something that indicates a rule of method. For Plato believes that ‘analogies’ or 
‘geometrical equalities’ are frequent in reality and basic to its structure, and this 
Pythagorean conviction indicates one simple but important rule of method: ‘look for 
proportions in reality, for they are there and you will find them.’ (Robinson 1953: 209) 
But this speculative suggestion does not to any significant degree enlighten our understanding 
of what makes an analogy valid. We are still left with the question why Plato would rely so 
heavily on analogies. Robinson suggests that there are “certain passages that offer something 
approaching discussions of analogy.” (Robinson 1953: 210) These passages are R. II 368 and 
R. IV 434D-435A. The first of these makes an analogy between small and big letters, and 
justice in one man and in the city. Just as it is easier to read big letters than small letters, it is 
also easier to find justice in the city than it is in one man. The methodical conclusion is that 
one should begin with the bigger, viz. more easily available, object, and then one should 
compare the bigger with the smaller, to see whether they are the same. The second passage 
says that if one first studies justice in the city, it will be easier to detect justice in the 
individual. One infers from what the justice is in the city, to what justice is in the individual. 
Then one checks to see that it is the same justice in the individual, and if it is not one needs to 
compare the two further. 
Robinson finds several problems in this discussion of analogy. The first is that the two 
passages present analogy as a method of discovery, not as a method of justification. There is 
often a thin line between discovery and justification
21
, but these two passages certainly does 
not give much in term of justifying analogy, with the exception that one can find the principle 
that one should infer from what is better known to what is less known – but this principle is 
the basis of all valid inference, not just that of analogy. This is what Robinson says: 
The passage regards analogy as a method of discovery and not also as a method of 
proof or argument. It therefore provides no justification of Plato’s use of analogies, 
including this very one between city and man, as a means of argument and persuasion. 
                                               
21
 E.g. Peirce’s concept of abduction is sometimes formulated as a method of discovery, at other times as a 
method of justification. Cf.  Plutynski 2011. 
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This, however, is not to say that such a justification is impossible. (Robinson 1953: 
211) 
The second problem is that Plato only has a hypothetical city in mind, not an actual one. Sc., 
“what he will get out of his analogy, therefore, seems to be whatever he himself put in.” 
(Robinson 1953: 212) A modern reader would demand a critical discussion of which cases 
(actual and hypothetical etc.) one can draw an analogy from, but Plato does not offer such a 
discussion in the passages. Not that Plato is uncritical to any analogical argument. Robinson 
refers to Phd. 99E, Men. 73A, R. I 337C, Chrm. 165E & 166B, Cra. 429B, Euthd. 298C, 
Men. 80C and R. III 408D, all passages critical to a proposed analogy
22
. Plato must have some 
criteria of a good analogy in mind, but this criterion is as mentioned not to be found in the two 
passages from the Republic. 
Robinson also comments on Plt. 277-9, where example (par¢deigma) is discussed. The 
context is children learning the letters, and having problem recognizing a letter in a long 
word, but not in a short one. By putting them next to each other, the child comes to recognise 
that they are the same letter.
23
 But also here there is a problem. 
[...] what it primarily justifies is the use of examples in teaching, not in suggesting 
new propositions to oneself or in proving such propositions. It is stated in terms of the 
man seeking to enlighten another, not of the man seeking to enlighten himself. To 
what extent can it justify the use of analogy in invention and proof as well as in 
teaching? (Robinson 1953: 213) 
However, Robinson thinks this problem of the possibility of teaching oneself can be 
successfully answered. The use of example can allow us to see the similarity between the 
example and another proposition, and to infer from the one to the other. 
In example, to modernize the image in the Republic, the juxtaposition of the two 
propositions causes the spark of knowledge to leap across from the old to the new, not 
because the old entails the new, but because of ‘the same likeness and nature’ 
dwelling in both of them, that is, in our language, because they are coordinate cases of 
the same universal, although that universal is not explicitly mentioned [...] Now, such 
being the nature of example, we can, so to speak, teach ourselves with it as well as 
others. (Robinson 1953: 213) 
                                               
22 Cf. Robinson 1953: 215-216. 
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 Cf. McPherran 2007: 358-9. He takes this to be a discussion of probabilistic induction rather than of analogy, 
based on the use of epagein and anagein in 278a. But this is a rather poor argument. 
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Take special notice of the formulation that Robinson uses. He says this is “because they are 
coordinate cases of the same universal”, or in the formulation that I have been using, that they 
belong under the same genus. However, this is but a possible explanation proposed by 
Robinson, merely indicating that Plato might have had this in mind. There is no univocal 
passage in the dialogues saying this, and as such it is but a minor point in favour of my 
interpretation of the analogies. But it is still a point that should be taken into consideration. 
One should also note that Plato had a certain conception of genus and species
24. “[...] 
to be able to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to 
splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.” (Phdr. 265e). Viz. he has a conception of genus, 
and further that this genus should be split into certain natural parts, the species. A species is 
thus not any arbitrary division, but a natural one. This could be connected with his concept of 
division (dia…resij), for instance Plt. 262d-263b where he compares splitting a genus into 
parts (e.g. the number ten thousand from all the rest) and splitting it into a real class (e.g. even 
and odd). And there are good indications that Aristotle took the concepts of genus and species 
from Plato, though developing them considerably. Cf. Ross, describing Plato’s method in the 
Sophist and Statesman: 
[...] of tracing the relations of assertability and deniability that exist between Ideas, 
and the relations of genus and species that exist between them. It is typical of 
Aristotle’s good sense that, while he completely rejected the ideal of deducing all truth 
from a single truth, he accepted from Plato the notions of genus, species, and 
differentia, and by adding to them the natural corollaries, property and accident, 
established his doctrine of predicables. (Ross 1951: 119) 
Robinson moves on to a related problem, as there seems to be a problem in how one can come 
to choose the right example, as in contrast to the teacher the self-learner does not beforehand 
have full knowledge of the issue. Robinson refers to the paradox in the Meno, and the solution 
that in some sense we already know and thus that the act of inquiry is but an act of 
recollection, as well as to Plt. 277d3: “It looks as if each of us knows everything in a kind of 
dreamlike way, and then again is ignorant of everything when as it were awake.” 
The two together release us from the puzzle; when we search we can direct ourselves 
and know when we have succeeded because we already know everything; yet we need 
to search because, while we already know all things in one sense, in other senses we 
do not know them yet. (Robinson 1953: 214) 
                                               





 answer to the paradox in the Meno, i.e. we can acquire new 
knowledge because we already know it in one way but not in another, is Robinson’s 
explanation of how one can acquire new knowledge through the use of analogies. He notes 
that this does not require that we know everything pace the Meno:  
Our preexistent knowledge of X, although vague, is enough to guide us reasonably 
well in the choice of examples; then the example guides us back to a more precise 
knowledge of the X that is both the beginning and the end of our search. (Robinson 
1953: 214-215) 
On the other side, Robinson cites many passages where Plato criticizes the use of analogies. 
These passages can be grouped in two. The first as those that criticize a proposed analogy on 
the basis that they are not actually of the same genus, i.e. it criticized the soundness of the 
proposed analogy, cf. R. III 408d: “you have taken up an unlike thing with the same logos” 
(Robinson’s translation). The second as those criticizing any argument based on similarity, 
i.e. the validity of such an argument, usually under the terms likeness (ÐmoiÒthtej) and like or 
probable (e„kèj). Cf. Sph. 231a: “A safe man will always be on his guard most of all about 
likenesses” (Robinson’s translation). Phd. 92d: “I know that arguments of which the proof is 
based on probability (tîn e„kÒtwn) are pretentious...” The first type of criticism does not 
attack the validity of analogies, and with a conditional analogy it actually allows us to acquire 
new knowledge, though in the negative sense that the two particulars are shown not to belong 
under the same genus (reductio ad absurdum). With the second it is difficult to see if this 
applies to the kind of analogy based on both belonging to the same genus. It rather seems to 
apply to analogies where there is no shared genus, but rather just sharing some attributes – as 
well as applying to arguments using probability, and in this respect it certainly does not apply 
to analogies based on a shared genus. Robinson puts more weight on these passages than I do, 
perhaps because he did not have a clear enough conception of the type of analogy that I am 
defending, and concludes as follows: 
They are only scattered hints, in which the idea is a chrysalis rather than a butterfly; 
and hence it is not surprising that they seem contradictory or at least incoherent. The 
proposal to look first at the large letters in the Republic, and the discussion of 
‘example’ in the Statesman, supported in a vague way by the ambiguous Phaedrus, 
suggest that analogical argument is a valuable instrument; but the opposite is 
suggested by a majority of the passages in which the notion of analogy more definitely 
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 Cf. APo. A 1. 
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appears, under the form of tÕ Ómoion or tÕ e„kÒj. There is no harmonization of these 
conflicting judgements, such as an attempt to state when analogy is good and when it 
is bad; and the prevailing opinion, which runs against analogy, seems to condemn 
Plato’s own predilection for analogies in his dialogues. (Robinson 1953: 217) 
What at least is clear is that Plato makes frequent use of analogies, especially the expert-
analogy, throughout his entire corpus. Robinson’s work only concerns the early and middle 
dialogues, but Lloyd has shown that this also applies for the later dialogues.
26
 Commenting on 
Robinson’s claim that the middle dialogues really depend on the use of analogy and imagery, 
he says that “indeed this is true not merely of the dialogues of the middle period, but of the 
whole Platonic Corpus.” (Lloyd 1966: 389) I think however that I am in more agreement with 
Lloyd’s conclusion, as he also explains away the apparent criticisms of analogies, and his 
view that one must go to Aristotle to find an in-depth justification of analogy. 
Plato certainly made several important contributions to the understanding of the logic 
of argument from analogy. Yet while we find many scattered remarks in the dialogues 
that bear on the use of imagery and likenesses and reflect judgements concerning the 
cogency of specific analogical arguments, it is evident that he did not carry out a 
formal analysis of argument from analogy as such. For the first such analysis we must, 
then, turn to Aristotle. (Lloyd 1966: 403) 
 
 
V.2 Aristotle’s discussion of analogies 
 
In contrast to our discussion of Plato above, which was pretty straightforward, our discussion 
of Aristotle will be elaborate and complicated. Previous commentators are numerous, and it 
concerns many aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy. The first question is in which order the 
various conceptions and discussions relevant for Aristotle’s justification of analogies should 
be presented. The ordering will to a large extent be arbitrary, but I think it most beneficial to 
discuss the passages where Aristotle discusses the difference between the specific, generic 
and analogical, which I also briefly mentioned above in my discussion of homology, at the 
end. I.e. to first clear away all the misconceptions, viz. red herrings, and at the end look at 
what I think is the solution. We can start by looking into the concept of analogy. 
 
                                               
26 Cf. Lloyd 1966: 389-403. 
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V. 2. 1 Aristotle’s concept of analogy (¢nalog…a) 
 
Aristotle inherits the concept of analogy (¢nalog…a) from Plato, where it is a proportional 
analogy taken from mathematics, and proportion is thus the etymological meaning of the 




/50 are proportional in 
virtue of both exhibiting the relation ½. An example of arithmetical proportion would be that 
12 - 7 = 9 – 4, in virtue of both being equal to 5. So that the form of a proportional analogy is 
that A is to B as C is to D, viz. that the relation between A and B is the same as the relation 
between C and D – a R b = c R d. The difference between its use in mathematics and in 




There are those who think that Aristotle’s concept of analogy is nothing more than this 
proportional analogy, most noteworthy Joseph Owens
28
. But some of the passages in Aristotle 
are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with an interpretation of it as a proportional 
analogy. In addition a considerable amount of literature has been written on the theological 
aspects of analogy, based on the reading of Aristotle made by Thomas Aquinas. But I do not 
find this aspect relevant to our present query, and will not comment on it
29
. Let us look at the 
passages in Aristotle. 
It is true as Owens says (Owens 1963: 123) that Aristotle describes analogy as 
proportional in Po. 1457b16-18: “That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms 
so related that the second is the first, as the fourth to the third; for one may then put the fourth 
in place of the second, and the second in place of the fourth.” This is however in the context 
of metaphor and not a theoretical discussion of analogy – I will discuss how metaphor relates 
to analogy below. Another description of analogy as proportional is Metaph. Q 1048b6-8: 
“But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by analogy—as A is in 
B or to B, C is in D or to D; for some are as movement to potentiality, and the others as 
substance to some sort of matter.” An expert-analogy is described as a proportional analogy, 
saying that “inasmuch as the relation of the builder towards the production of a house is like 
that of the doctor towards the production of health, and it is not a property of a doctor to 
                                               
27 Cf. Robinson 1952:466. 
28
 Cf. Owens 1963: 123-125. Also cf. Hesse 1959-1960: 87, and Hesse 1966. Also cf. Anderson 1952. Owen 1960: 
180 is a bit more ambiguous, saying that “the idea of proportion is central to analogy (Met. 1016b 34-35), even 
when the terms are not fully stated because they are obvious...” 
29 For those interested, vide especially Summa Theologica Q. 13, McInerny 1996 and Rocca 2004. 
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produce health, it will not be a property of a builder to produce a house.” (Top. 1036b35-
137a1) But it is not clear why the relation should be the same. There is also a description of 
proportional analogy in Metaph. N 1093b18-20: “[...] one by analogy. For in each category of 
being an analogous term is found—as the straight line is in length, so is the plane in surface, 
perhaps the odd in number, and the white in colour.” This last is in the context of discussing 
the Pythagorean and to a certain extent Platonic view (see the discussion of Robinson in the 
previous section) that there are hidden mathematical proportions in reality, and it is difficult 
to infer anything about Aristotle’s conception of analogy from this passage. Cf. Julia Annas’s 
comments to this passage: 
An interesting (because unparalleled) attempt by Aristotle to salvage something from 
what his opponents say. He admits that there are interesting mathematical structures 
reflected in nature, and that the Academy do point out formal analogies between 
generically different fields. But he firmly denies that this is anything more than 
coincidence; in particular, the numbers do not determine the natural facts. Aristotle 
does not give any background to these supposed analogies here, and they seem very 
dubious. Although Aristotle sounds less unsympathetic to them than one might expect, 
he cannot afford to allow that they are significant, for this would surely undermine the 
autonomy of different fields of inquiry, something which Aristotle is strongly 
committed to. (Annas 1976: 219) 
The pure mathematical meaning is discussed in EN V 1131a29-b24, where it is argued that 
justice is a species of analogy. The definition given is of an entirely mathematical nature. 
Note that Aristotle allows there to be only 3 terms, if one of the terms are used twice. Note 
also that he says this is a geometrical proportion, not an arithmetical one (see above for this 
distinction). 
For proportion is equality of ratios, and involves four terms at least (that discrete 
proportion involves four terms is plain, but so does continuous proportion, for it uses 
one term as two and mentions it twice; e.g. as the line A is to the line B, so is the line 
B to the line C; the line B, then, has been mentioned twice, so that if the line B be 
assumed twice, the proportional terms will be four); [...] As the term A, then, is to B, 
so will C be to D, and therefore, alternando, as A is to C, B will be to D. Therefore 
also the whole is in the same ratio to the whole; [...] (Mathematicians call this kind of 
proportion geometrical; for it is in geometrical proportion that it follows that the 
whole is to the whole as either part is to the corresponding part.) (EN V 1131a31-b14) 
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In APo. 77b39-78a4, Aristotle criticizes an analogy, where Fire is generated quickly and 
equally this analogy is generated quickly. Now this is not a proportional analogy, and 
Aristotle says that here there is no deduction. But he rephrases it into a proportional analogy, 
and says that in this case there is deduction: “if multiple analogy follows fastest analogy and 
the fastest changing analogy follows fire.” So that A, multiple analogy is to B, fastest 
analogy, just as B, fastest analogy, is to C, fire. Here we have a proportional analogy with 
three terms, where B is used twice. It would be reasonable to interpret this passage as coming 
out in favour of proportional analogy, and against a looser analogy based on two terms. But at 
the same time, it shows that Aristotle has an understanding of analogy that is broader than just 
proportional analogy, even though he in this passage privileges proportional analogy. 
In NE II 1106a32-1106b3 he explains that one cannot use arithmetical proportion to 
arrive at the intermediate for humans – referring to the proper diet for Milo and for a 
beginner, and that it has to be the intermediate relatively to the man. Thus he has the concept 
of arithmetical proportion, but thinks it at the very least not applicable to ethics. 
A very different conception of analogy is used in APo. 76a38-40: “Of the things they 
use in the demonstrative sciences some are proper to each science and others common—but 
common by analogy, since things are useful in so far as they bear on the genus under the 
science.” Aristotle is here saying that there are principles common to all the sciences, but that 
these are common by analogy because the principle has to be applied to each science – so that 
in geometry it has to be applied to lines, in arithmetic to numbers
30
. Sc. this passage cannot 
possibly be interpreted as a proportional analogy
31
, and thus it most definitely is a distinct 
usage of analogy from that of proportional analogy. It is rather the sharing of some nature or 




Other passages using this meaning of analogy are APo. 99a15-16, where it is said that 
when things are the same by analogy in the major term, they are also the same in middle term, 
so that the cause of them are also the same
33
. Also Metaph. L 1070a32: “The causes and the 
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 Cf. Ross 1949: 539. 
31
 Though Pellegrin 1987: 322 proposes that it can be interpreted as a proportional analogy of this form: “that 
which is a in genos A is b in genos B.” One then have 4 terms, but the addition of the 2 additional terms (A and 
B) does not seem to add anything to the analogy, and are thus superfluous. 
32 Owen 1960: 171 paraphrases Theophrastus: “T. is careful to correct his overemphasis on the fragmentation 
of knowledge (8 b 24-27): it is also the task of science to aim at generality, and this may produce a subject-
matter which is identical not in kind but simply by analogy.” 
33
 Cf. Ross 1949: 670; though note that Ross erroneously thinks the analogical feature is one of same function 
or relation. For more on this see below. 
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principles of different things are in a sense different, but in a sense, if one speaks universally 
and analogically, they are the same for all.” I.e. viewed as high enough universal, they are 
analogically one. See also a few lines down, 1070b18: “all things have not the same elements, 
but analogically they have”. And at 1071a4-6: “And in yet another way, analogically identical 
things are principles, i.e., actuality and potency; but these also are not only different for 
different things but also apply in different senses to them. Again at 1071a25-27: “the causes 
of things that are not in the same class, e.g. of colours, sounds, substances, and quantities, are 
different except in an analogical sense”. 
Metaph. D 1016b31-1017a2 says that “some things are one in number, others in 
species, others in genus, and others by analogy”. (I will discuss this passage in more detail 
when dealing with the discussion of the different senses of identity below.) The same view is 
expressed in Metaph. D 1018a12-14, though here discussing being different rather than being 
one. The same division is found in HA 1.1: 
There are some animals whose parts are neither identical in form nor differing in the 
way of excess or defect; but they are the same only in the way of analogy, as, for 
instance, bone is only analogous to fish-bone, nail to hoof, hand to claw, and scale to 
feather; for what the feather is in a bird, the scale is in a fish. (HA 486b18-21) 
Here one might understand the last sentence as a proportional analogy, but it is also evident 
that this passage understands analogy as something more than just proportional analogy. The 
same can be said of Top. 208a7-17. A similar passage is found in PA 644a16-23, the context 
being that Aristotle wants to explain why water animals and winged animals are not gathered 
together under a common genus: 
Groups that only differ in degree, and in the more or less of an identical element that 
they possess, are aggregated under a single class; groups whose attributes are only 
analogous are separated. For instance, bird differs from bird by gradation, or by excess 
and defect—some birds have long feathers, others short ones. Bird and Fish (sic) only 
agree in having analogous organs; for what in the bird is feather, in the fish is scale. It 
is not easy to do this in all cases; for in most animals what is common is so by 
analogy. 
In APo. 98a20-23, a slight variation of the above usage is found. Here it is said that it can be 
used for inference. After discussing cases falling under a known genus, he says that the single 
nature of pounce, spine, and bone lacks a name, but that there still is a single nature of them 
all. We will be looking closer at this chapter as well below. 
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From this it is clear, contrary to the opinion of Owens, that Aristotle developed the 
concept of analogy. Often it only denotes a proportional analogy, but there is also a different 
conception – which might be combined with a proportional analogy – signifying similarities 
between things of different genera. 
As Owens erroneously explains the difference between the equivocal as directed 
towards something one (prÕj ›n34), and the equivocal per analogia35, by saying that the first is 
a two-term relation and the second a four-term relation – we now need a different way of 
separating the two. Owens notes that the Scholastics mixed the two concepts together, but this 
does not fit with Aristotle referring to the two differently, using different words. An example 
of something being equivocal as referring towards some one thing can be found in a 
discussion of the equivocal in Metaph. K 1060b35-1061a7: 
The term seems to be used in the way we have mentioned, like ‘medical’ and 
‘healthy’. For each of these also we use in many senses; and each is used in this way 
because the former refers somehow to medical science and the latter to health. Other 
terms refer to other things, but each term refers to some one thing. For a prescription 
and a knife are called medical because the former proceeds from medical science, and 
the latter is useful to it. And a thing is called healthy in the same way; one thing 
because it is indicative of health, another because it is productive of it. 
To offer but a tentative solution, as I do not want to discuss this issue at too great a length, it 
seems much more reasonable to find the difference between the two kinds in the different 
ways that they are said to be equivocal. To take analogy first, pounce, spine, and bone are said 
to share the same nature, in a certain way, without belonging under the same genera. So that 
they share the same nature in one way, but because they do not share the same genera they are 
also equivocal in another way. With the other kind however, it is not said to be the same 
because they in a certain sense have the same nature. Rather they are the same because they 
have the same goal, or are related to the same science – but in nature they are very different. 
So much for the difference between analogy and the prÕj ›n equivocal. 
We have been discussing analogy in order to find a justification for Aristotle’s use of 
the expert-analogy. As you remember my theory is that the expert-analogy works through a 
shared genera, and that the terms are used univocally. Aristotle’s use of analogy as similarity 
between things of different genera does not then fit with the expert-analogy. This is both 
                                               
34 Viz. analogy of attribution, which is the scholastic term. 
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because these do not have a shared genus, and because they to a certain extent are equivocal. 
However, I noted that we need to take a closer look at many of these passages below. But first 




V. 2. 2 Metaphors (metafor£), images (e„kèn) and likenesses (ÐmoiÒthtej) 
 
Three concepts are for Aristotle closely related to that of analogy. These are both the concept 
of image (e„kèn), and likenesses (ÐmoiÒthtej), as we have seen above for Plato, and Aristotle 
also is the first to examine the concept of metaphors (metafor£)
36
. Let us deal with them in 
order. 
Aristotle defines metaphor in Po. 1457b6-9: “Metaphor consists in giving the thing a 
name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or 
from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy.” I.e. the name is 
transferred from what it properly refers to, on to something else.  The term is then used not in 
its literal sense, but in a metaphorical one
37. Note that “the term metaphora is used for both 
the process of transference and the name so transferred.” (Janko 1987: 129) Following this 
definition he exemplifies each of the four types: 
That from genus to species is exemplified in ‘Here stands my ship’; for lying at anchor 
is a sort of standing. That from species to genus in ‘Truly ten thousand good deeds has 
Ulysses wrought’, where ‘ten thousand’, which is a particular large number, is put in 
place of the generic ‘a large number’. That from species to species in ‘Drawing the life 
with the bronze,’ and in ‘Severing with the enduring bronze’; where the poet uses 
‘draw’ in the sense of ‘sever’ and ‘sever’ in that of ‘draw’, both words meaning to 
‘take away’ something. That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms 
so related that the second is to the first, as the fourth to the third; for one may then put 
the fourth in place of the second, and the second in place of the fourth. Now and then, 
too, they qualify the metaphor by adding on to it that to which the word it supplants is 
relative. Thus a cup is in relation to Dionysus what a shield is to Ares. The cup 
accordingly will be described as the ‘shield of Dionysus’ and the shield as the ‘cup of 
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 Cf. Moran 1996: 385. 
37 Cf. Top. 123a33-35. 
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Ares’. Or to take another instance: As old age is to life, so is evening to day. One will 
accordingly describe evening as the ‘old age of the day’—or by the Empedoclean 
equivalent; and old age as the ‘evening’ or ‘sunset of life’. (Po. 1457b9-25) 
You must forgive me quoting so extensively, but this really is a most central passage for 
understanding Aristotle’s concept of metaphor. From this it is clear that metaphor uses and 
relies upon a relation between the thing transferred from and the one transferred to. The same 
thing is said in Rh. 1412a10-11: “Metaphors must be drawn, as has been said already, from 
things that are related to the original thing, and yet not obviously be so”. There has to be some 
relation, some similarity, otherwise it will not be a good metaphor. “Metaphors like other 
things may be inappropriate.” (Rh. 1406b6) “Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which 
means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified”. (Rh. 1405a10-11) Of 
transference of a term where there is no likeness, he says that “such phrases are worse than 
metaphor [...]” (Top. 140a9) And it should also be noted that what is being transferred is a 
name (Ônoma)– the name ‘shield’ is being transferred to Dionysus, etc. Now the four-fold 
division that has been described goes from that where there is a very close relation (i.e. from 
genus to species) to the more and more remote, the most remote being that from analogy
38
. 
Thus there is the most transference of meaning in that from analogy, and based on the space 
that he devotes to discussing it, he thinks that the transference from analogy to be the most 
important type of metaphor. This is confirmed in Rh. 1411a1: “Of the four kinds of metaphor 
the most taking is the proportional kind.” He says that metaphor is a third possibility to the 
equivocal and the univocal in Top. 139b32-140a17
39
, but this passage is too obscure to make 
anything out of this. Owen’s suggestion that metaphors use a term with a focal meaning, i.e. 
has one primary definition and a secondary closely connected definition, might be a way to 
understand it, though as said the textual basis is unclear. 
Aristotle says that there are positive aspects of using metaphors: 
It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of these poetical forms, as also 
of compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of 
metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of 
genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in 
dissimilars. (Po. 1459a4-8) 
                                               
38 Cf. Janko 1987: 129. Note that metaphor “is used in a wider sense than English ‘metaphor,’ which is mainly 
confined to the third and fourth of Aristotle’s types.” (Lucas 1968: 204, quoted in Ricoeur 1996: 370.) 
39 Cf. Owen 1960: 174. 
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The meaning here must be that metaphor is the greatest thing to master in the poetical, as one 
can see from the context
40
. It is also said that metaphor relies on similarities (ÐmoiÒthtej), and 
remember that these similarities then will be of the four kinds of relations discussed earlier in 
this chapter. Further, metaphors give liveliness to a text
41
, improving the style (lšxij) of the 
work. 
The use of metaphor outside of the poetical is however damagingly criticized by 
Aristotle
42
. Discussing definitions, he says at APo. 97b37-39 that “if one should not argue in 
metaphors, it is clear too that one should not define either by metaphors or what is said in 
metaphors; for then one will necessarily argue in metaphors.” Taken with the paragraph 
directly preceding, the impression is that metaphors should not be used because of their lack 
of clarity. “For a metaphorical expression is always obscure.” (Top. 139b34) Again, 
criticizing Empedocles’ use of metaphors, he says: “Metaphors are poetical and so that 
expression of his may satisfy the requirements of a poem, but as to knowledge of nature it is 
unsatisfactory.” (Mete. 357a25-28) On the whole, the conclusion must be that metaphors 
should be avoided, with the exception of in the poetical and in some circumstances rhetoric. 
Image, or simile, is discussed only in the Rhetorics, and interestingly enough not in 
the Poetics
43
. But in the discussion there, the difference between image and metaphor is pretty 
minimal. ‘They differ only by the presence or absence of a specific term of comparison: the 
particle like or as (hōs) [...] the simile says “this is like that,” whereas the metaphor says “this 
is that.”’ (Ricoeu 1996: 337-338). Let us look at the passages: 
The simile also is a metaphor; the difference is but slight. When the poet says: ‘He 
leapt on the foe as a lion’, this is a simile; when he says of him ‘the lion leapt’, it is a 
metaphor—here, since both are courageous, he has transferred to Achilles the name of 
‘lion’. Similes are useful in prose as well as in verse; but not often, since they are of 
the nature of poetry. They are to be employed just as metaphors are employed, since 
they are really the same thing except for the difference mentioned. (Rh. 1406b20-27) 
Their difference is, as mentioned, very minimal. In the greek the difference is only the 
addition of æj d‚. As it says later in the chapter, after mentioning quite a few examples of 
similes: “All of these ideas may be expressed either as similes or as metaphors; those which 
                                               
40 Cf. Janko 1987: 64 and his translation of On Poets Fr. 10: “Empedocles is Homeric and clever in expression, as 
he is metaphorical and uses the other things that succeed in the art of poetry.” Also cf. Rh. 1405a4-10. 
41 Cf. Rh. 1411b24-25. 
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 For a more thorough discussion of the positive and negative aspects of metaphors, vide Lloyd 1996: 208-212. 
43 Cf. Ricoeur 1996: 336. 
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succeed as metaphors will obviously do well also as similes, and similes, with the explanation 
omitted, will appear as metaphors.” (Rh. 1407a10-14) So that the difference is that the simile 
has the explanation, while the metaphor lacks it. Viz. that in the simile the transfer is stated 
explicitly, while in the metaphor it is left implicit. Of the two, Aristotle seems to prefer the 
metaphor: “The simile, as has been said before, is a metaphor, differing from it only in the 
way it is put; and just because it is longer it is less attractive.” (Rh. 1410b16-18) The 
difference between the two looks to be parallel with the difference between a substitution 
view metaphor and a comparison view metaphor
44
. The substitution view holds that the 
metaphor substitutes one word for another, e.g. ‘Richard is a lion’ as a substitution for 
‘Richard is brave’. The comparison view on the other hand holds that one compares the two, 
e.g. ‘Richard is like a lion’. Indeed, Black says that according to this view “the metaphorical 
statement might be replaced by an equivalent literal comparison.” (Black 1962: 35) To 
summarise, the image is for Aristotle nothing but a more lengthy metaphor. 
However, one of the examples of image that he presents might be problematic. 
Referring to Plato’s Republic 488a ff. he says “there is the simile about the Athenian people, 
who are compared to a ship-owner
45
 who is strong but a little deaf [...]” (Rh. 1406b34-36) The 
example which Aristotle here mentions is a typical example of the expert-analogy. I will not 
discuss the example in detail here, as I will do so below. But the short explanation of why 
Aristotle describes this as an image might be that he is referring to the use of the ship-owner 
in place of the Athenian people, and not to the analogy between the ship’s captain and the 
Athenian leader of state. It is the captain who is the expert, not the ship-owner, and thus the 
expert-analogy is not between the ship-owner and the Athenian people. So that the expert-
analogy is the part that holds the argumentative strength, while the comparison between the 
ship-owner and the Athenian people is an image drawing a comparison between that 
particular ship-owner and the Athenian people. I.e. it says that the Athenian people is like this 
strong but rather deaf ship-owner, who is unable to see the expert and therefore gives over 
control of the ship to someone without the knowledge of how to steer it. But as I said, this is a 
                                               
44 This terminology and the examples used are from Black 1962 ch. 3. Black defends a third alternative, which 
he calls an interaction view of metaphor, where the meaning of both what the term is transferred from and 
what the term is transferred to interacts – changing the meaning of both. Though this view might have its 
credit, it does not concern our present inquiry as this view does not fit any theory of Plato or Aristotle, nor does 
it have a bearing on my proposed interpretation of the expert-analogy. 
45 W. Rhys Roberts translates in the Complete works of Aristotle “ship’s captain”, but the word, naÚklhroj, 
properly means a shipowner. 
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tentative explanation of how Aristotle could describe this as an image, and I will look in more 
detail on the passage from Plato later. 
To sum up our discussion of metaphor and image, these concepts does not seem to 
give any justification of the type of analogy within a genus that I am defending. They are both 
concerned with the transference of names, not with inference from one particular to another 
under a common genus. There is the four-part division of metaphor to take into consideration, 
and Aristotle certainly makes use of the concepts of species, genus and analogy as variations 
of generality, but beyond this similar framework there are no common grounds with the 
expert-analogy. And beyond a doubt, if we are to find a justification for this kind of analogy, 
it will not be under the concepts of metaphor and image. 
To move on to the concept of likenesses, it is a much wider concept than that of 
metaphor. It is clear that there must be some likeness and relation involved in a metaphor, and 
even that this varies depending on which of the four types of metaphor is in use. But 
likenesses are also used for finding syllogisms, inductions, definitions and analogies
46. “The 
instruments whereby we are to become well supplied with deductions are four: [...] fourth, the 
investigation of likeness.” (Top. 105a22-25) He then gives examples of these: “that the 
relation of the healthy to health is like that of the vigorous to vigour.” (Top. 105a30-31) As 
we can see, likeness is here exemplified with a proportional analogy. All these four are 
mentioned and discussed right at the end of the first Topics. “The examination of likeness is 
useful with a view both to inductive arguments and to hypothetical deductions, and also with 
a view to the rendering of definitions.” (Top. 108b7-8) Then he explains why likeness is 
useful for these three, and at the same time he mentions a type of analogy: 
It is useful for inductive arguments, because it is by means of an induction of 
particulars in cases that are alike that we claim to induce the universal; for it is not 
easy to do this if we do not know the points of likeness. It is useful for hypothetical 
deductions because it is a reputable opinion that among similars what is true of one is 
true also of the rest. If, then, with regard to any of them we are well supplied with 
matter for a discussion, we shall secure a preliminary admission that however it is in 
these cases, so it is also in the case before us; then when we have proved the former 
we shall have proved, on the strength of the hypothesis, the matter before us as well; 
for we have first made the hypothesis that however it is in these cases, so it is also in 
the case before us, and have then produced the demonstration. It is useful for the 
                                               
46 Cf. Lloyd 1966: 408-410. 
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rendering of definitions because, if we are able to see what is the same in each 
individual case of it, we shall be at no loss when we define it; for the common 
predicates that which is most definitely predicated in what the thing is is likely to be 
the genus. Likewise, also, in the case of objects widely divergent, the examination of 
likeness is useful for purposes of definition, e.g. the sameness of a calm at sea, and 
windlessness in the air (each being a form of rest), and of a point on a line and the unit 
in number (each being a principle). If, then, we render as the genus what is common to 
all the cases, we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately. (Top. 108b9-28) 
First, Aristotle says that induction rely on the likeness between some particulars as evidence. 
Thus, likenesses here play an evidential role. Second, that hypothetical deductions rely on the 
reputable opinion (œndoxa) that among similars what is true of one is true of all. Here 
likenesses are part of a premise underlying many hypothetical deductions. Third, likeness 
enables one to see the common predicate, which is most likely to be the genus. Fourth, this is 
also said for seeing that things widely apart (e.g. calm at sea and windlessness in the air) 
belong under a common genus, namely that of rest. Both the second and fourth of these looks 
remarkably much like the description that I gave of the expert-analogy. The same can be said 
for the discussion of likenesses in chapter 17 of Topics I. Here he first discusses likeness “in 
the case of things belonging to different genera, the formula being: as one is to one thing, so is 
another to another [...]” (Top. 180a7-8) He then gives two examples of this, both proportional 
analogies. The second type of likeness is “things which belong to the same genus, to see if 
any identical attribute belongs to them all, e.g. to a man and a horse and a dog; for in so far as 
they have any identical attribute, in so far they are alike.” (Top. 108a14-17) As we can see, 
the likeness within the same genus does not give rise to a proportional analogy, but instead a 
more direct relation. In this passage the emphasis is however on discovery, and not so much 
argument. But it is also applicable to argument, as seen in the quote from Top. 108b9-28. 
To sum up, the concept of likeness seems to be closely related to the kind of analogy 
within a genus that I am defending, and it does hint at a justification for it. Though one might 
have the impression that likeness is something that one perceives, or that works as a premise 
or foundation of an argument, rather than it itself making up a form of argument. And I think 
the evidence points towards that conclusion. However, the discussion in the Topics is rather 
brief, and in addition it is not clear to what degree this can be applied beyond his dialectics. In 





V. 2. 3 Paradigm (par£deigma) and induction (™p£gwgh) 
 
With the paradigm (par£deigma), viz. argument by example, and induction (™p£gwgh), we 
have the two key concepts that are usually linked with the expert-analogy. As we have seen 
above, the concept of induction was central in the discussion among previous commentators 
of the expert-analogy in Plato
47
. Induction was there the key concept used when interpreting 
the expert-analogy. At the same time, the commentators on the expert-analogy in Aristotle 
just as often interprets it as a paradigm. E.g. “the main texts in which Aristotle deals with 
explicit analogical argument are those in which he describes and analyses the paradigm.” 
(Lloyd 1966: 405) Let us look in some detail on these two concepts to see how applicable 
they may be on the expert-analogy, beginning with induction. 
If Aristotle’s conception of induction had been the same as our modern conception, it 
would hardly be advantageous to look at induction for our current inquiry. Our modern 
conception of induction, i.e. inferring from a regular occurrence that the same thing will 
happen in the future, has been shown to have serious faults. Its reliance on the principle of the 
uniformity of nature is problematic, and normally it is simply referred to as the problem of 
induction. “The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its 
neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been 
useful to the chicken.” (Russell 2001: 35) Largely because of this induction is today viewed 
as any kind of inference where the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premisses. 
The type of analogical structure that I have proposed above does not have any similarity with 
this modern conception of induction. 
Fortunately, induction for Aristotle is something quite different
48
. Our word induction 
is etymologically related to the greek ™p£gwgh, as inductio was the latin translation of the 
greek ™p£gwgh (the non-technical meaning of both is to lead on). The first technical 
occurrence of induction is Cicero’s De Inventione 3149, see also Top. 1050, but already by that 
time the meaning had changed. Cicero’s conception of induction is actually Aristotle’s 
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 Cf. Annas 1976: 154: “[...] is not, however, the same as modern induction, but more like a generalization 
from one or more convincing examples.” 
49 “Induction is a form of argument which leads the person with whom one is arguing to give assent to certain 
undisputed facts; through this assent it wins his approval of a doubtful proposition because this resembles the 
facts to which he has assented.” Cic. De Inventione 31. 
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 “This form of argument which attains the desired proof by citing several parallels is called induction, in Greek 
™pagwg» (epagoge); Socrates frequently used this in his dialogues.” Cic. Top. 10. 
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Robinson characterised the expert-analogy, and in general the use of cases, under the 
Aristotelian term induction (™p£gwgh). And later commentators have followed Robinson’s 
terminology. Given this it is reasonable to think that Aristotle’s concept of induction can 
enlighten our understanding of the expert-analogy. There are primarily two reasons for 
characterising the expert-analogy under induction. Robinson
52
 refers to Top. A 12: 
Having made these distinctions, we must distinguish how many species there are of 
dialectical arguments. There are induction and deduction. Now what deduction is has 
been said before; induction is a passage from particulars to universals, e.g. the 
argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise the skilled 
charioteer, then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task. (Top. 
105a10-16) 
If one accepts this dichotomy, then the expert-analogy is either induction or deduction. Since 
induction is here described as arguing from cases, and even cases of experts, the natural 
conclusion is that it is induction. While he did not do the same when discussing deduction 
earlier in Top. A 1. As a second point is the attribution that Aristotle makes to Socrates
53: “For 
two things may be fairly ascribed by Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, 
both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science.” (Metaph. M 1078b27-29) 
There is almost universal agreement that the inductive arguments referred to is the argument 
from cases, in particular the expert-analogies
54
. Hamlyn 1976 argues for an alternative 
interpretation, namely that it is the type of argument used in the Meno 82b-85c when Socrates 
questions the slave-boy. I am inclined to accept McKirahan’s conclusion in this regard55, 
namely that 1078b27-29 gives insufficient data to conclude exactly what kind of argument 
Aristotle had in mind. Still, I would think it reasonable to assume that it is the expert-analogy 
that Aristotle had in mind, based on the frequency of its usage in both Plato and Xenophon. 
At the very least, based on these two points, there are good reasons for studying Aristotle’s 
conception of induction when looking for a justification of the expert-analogies. 
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53 An attribution that Cicero repeats in his discussions of induction, see above. 
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55 Cf. McKirahan 1983: 3-4. 
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We are however faced with problems right from the start. Robinson was not blind to 
these problems, though he still thought it worthwhile to characterise the expert-analogy under 
induction. After proposing a definition, as well as citing Aristotle’s definition from Top. A 12, 
he says the following: “Both my definition and Aristotle’s present definition differ from his 
account of epagoge and what he calls ‘the syllogism obtained from epagoge’ in the Prior 
Analytics (II 23), and resemble rather closely his account of what he calls ‘paradigm’ in that 
work (II 24).” (Robinson 1953: 33) 
Now APr. B 23 is a highly controversial passage, and there is no clear consensus on 
how it should be interpreted. The chapter consists of three paragraphs, of which the second is 
the essential one. It begins saying that “induction, or rather the deduction which springs out of 
induction, consists in deducing a relation between one extreme and the middle by means of 
the other extreme, e.g. if B is the middle term between A and C, it consists in proving through 
C that A belongs to B.” (APr. 68b15-18) He then gives an example of this, where C is 
particular long-lived animals, viz. man
56
, horse, and mule, A is long-liver, B is bileless. He 
ends the paragraph saying that “we must apprehend C as made up of all the particulars. For 
induction proceeds through an enumeration of all the cases.” (APr. 68b27-29) The most 
prevalent interpretation can be represented with Ross, where the chapter is said to describe 
perfect induction, i.e. one infers that ‘all X is P’ by surveying that every instance of X is P. 
“The present chapter must be regarded as a tour de force in which A. tries at all costs to bring 
induction into the form of syllogism; and only perfect induction can be so treated.” (Ross 
1949: 486) I.e. it reduces induction to deduction. Further, it is assumed that it is a survey of 
each species falling under the genus of bileless, and not a survey of each man, horse etc. that 
is or ever have been, as the first is seen as possible while the second is impossible
57
. But this 
presentation of induction is at the same time seen as being in conflict with other uses of 
induction, and Ross says that perfect induction is the “least interesting and important kind 
[...]” (Ross 1949: 486) Thus this reading, though it is the most natural interpretation of the 
text, has a serious fault. Several alternative interpretations have been offered. 1) Pace 
Whewell one can say that it does not describe an inference, but rather a way of discovery. 
Induction thus understood is a way of connecting together two conception (e.g. long-liver and 
bileless) as a sort of working hypothesis. But there is very weak textual basis for this 
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. 2) Engberg-Pedersen supports a variant of this, and has suggested that the 
chapter is concerned with clarifying an aspect regarding all induction, namely that all 
inductions claim e.g. “(1) that all long-lived individuals (C) are gall-less (B) and (2) that B 
does not go beyond C.” (Engberg-Pedersen 1979: 313) Thus Aristotle is not solely concerned 
with perfect induction, rather he clarifies that all inductions makes certain claims, though 
these are claims that cannot be proved. Engberg-Pedersen finds this interpretation consistent 
with his understanding of induction as a dialectical method solely confined to gaining 
conviction, and where nous is responsible for ‘seeing’ the universal. However, his 
interpretation of the passage is solely based on the argument that this reading would be 
consistent with his understanding of induction. As this understanding has serious faults, as 
discussed by Upton, this interpretation does not seem viable. 3) Another way to interpret the 
passage is to say that it is not about induction at all, but rather a special form of deduction. 
“So there are two kinds of deductions, deductions of middled premises and deductions of 
unmiddled premises.” (McCaskey 2007: 354) The passage describes this second type of 
deduction, where instead of having a middle term connecting the major and minor, one has 
three terms where two are convertible with each other. McCaskey suggests that conversion 
works either from a thing and its definition, or a thing and a proprium of it. Viz. he interprets 
it thus that Aristotle presumes that all B are C, and all C are B. I find this interpretation 
tempting, but its presentation of conversion is not completely satisfactory. 4) Conversion is 
also central for Groarke’s interpretation, but he thinks that it is an induction, namely a form of 
intuitive induction
59
. By studying a limited sample, C, one arrives at the intuition that B 
causes A. Thus it is primarily a method of discovery, but Groarke also thinks that it is a 
method of inference. The problem with this interpretation is that it looks like a petitio 
principii – it presumes what it sets out to prove. 
I do not think any of these interpretations are entirely satisfactory. Let us therefore see 
if any of these interpretations can give any justification for our analogy by common genus. 1) 
Perfect induction does not fit, as the expert-analogies only use a few instances. And if they are 
then to be seen as incomplete inductions, the consequence would be that the expert-analogy 
would be fallacious. 2) As this view holds that induction is not an inference it clearly cannot 
help us. 3) This holds some interest, for given that this interpretation is correct, it would be 
reasonable to assume that the next chapter dealing with the paradigm should also be seen as 
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some kind of deduction. And this is exactly what I suggest below. But beyond this I cannot 
see any points of interest. 4) Intuitive induction does not seem to be anything like what we are 
looking for. 
The other passages dealing with induction is much more straightforward. He compares 
it to likeness, which as we have seen had some points of similarity with the expert-analogy. 
He says it resembles induction, but that it is something different. “For in induction it is the 
universal whose admission is secured from the particulars, whereas in arguments from 
likeness, what is secured is not the universal under which all the like cases fall.” (Top. 
156b14-17) Here again we see it stated that induction argues from particulars to the universal. 
To take yet another instance of this, at the beginning of APo. it is said that induction works by 
“proving the universal through the particular’s [sic] being clear.” (71a9) This standard way of 
defining induction, as inference from particular to universal, does not fit with the expert-
analogy (being an inference from particular to particular). Induction and deduction is defined 
somewhat differently in Rh. 1356b13-18: 
When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is 
induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions 
being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, 
whether universally or for the most part this is called deduction in dialectic, 
enthymeme in rhetoric. 
Needless to say this second type of definition is less technical, and it views induction and 
example as belonging under the same definition (in contrast to the more technical definition 
that strictly separates them)
60
. The interesting thing is that our expert-analogy seems to fit 
both of these definitions. However, I find it hard to get anything out of the definition in Rh. In 
contrast, pace Robinson, using the more technical definition it is clear that the expert-analogy 
falls under paradigm, and not induction. 
Therefore let us now look at the concept of the paradigm. Aristotle’s discussion of the 
paradigm is confined to the Rhetoric, as well as APr. B 24 
61
. At the beginning of Rh. B 20, 
after saying that paradigm and enthymeme are the two kinds of argument common to all of 
oratory, he says that the paradigm “has the nature of induction, which is the foundation of 
reasoning.” (Rh. 1393a26-27) However, one should note that the greek says that the paradigm 
is like (Ómoion) induction, and one should be cautious of concluding right away that paradigm 
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is a kind of induction. That would be reading too much into the text. And the same holds for 
the second part of the sentence – it says that induction is the foundation of reasoning (¢rc»), 
but not necessarily that paradigm also is a kind of foundation. It is clearer in Rh. 1356b2-3: 
“the example is an induction [...] But this in itself does not tell us much about the relation 
between the two. This is elaborated, after saying that paradigm is an argument from part to 
part, in Rh. 1357b29-30: “When two statements are of the same order, but one is more 
familiar than the other, the former is an example.” Genos is here translated as order, but one 
could just as well have translated it with genus. So that paradigm is related to induction, with 
the difference that it argues from one particular to another where both are under a common 
genus. In other words, paradigm is described as the type of analogy that I have been 
defending above. Let us look in more detail on the concept of paradigm. 
In Rh. B 20 he says there are three varieties of the paradigm. The first is “the mention 
of actual past facts [...]” (Rh. 1393a29) He gives the following example: Darius did not cross 
the Aegean until he had taken Egypt, and the same with Xerxes. Therefore the present king of 
Persia will also cross the Aegean if he takes Egypt, and therefore the Greeks must stop him 
from taking Egypt. In other words, it is an analogy from an event in the past to a similar event 
in the future, inferring from what happened in the past incident to what will happen in the 
future event. The idea behind this first variety of the paradigm can be formulated as the 
maxim of George Santayana, that “those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat 
it.” Call it an ‘argument from history’. 
The two other varieties consist “in the invention of facts by the speaker.” (Rh. 
1393b29-30) These two are “the illustrative parallel and the fable (e.g. the fables of Aesop, or 
those from Libya).” (Rh. 1393b30-31) The fable (lÒgoi) is something very much like Plato’s 
concept of images (e„kÒnoj), e.g. the image of the cave, the sun, and others62. Sc. the fable is a 
made-up story, where this story is used in order to infer on some actual issue at hand. I don’t 
think it necessary to elaborate in any greater degree on this type of paradigm. However, we 
will need to look in great detail on the illustrative parallel (par£bolh), as will be evident from 
the example he gives of this type of paradigm. 
The illustrative parallel is the sort of argument Socrates used: e.g. ‘Public officials 
ought not to be selected by lot. That is like using the lot to select athletes, instead of 
choosing those who are fit for the contest; or using the lot to select a steersman from 
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among a ship’s crew, as if we ought to take the man on whom the lot falls, and not the 
man who knows most about it’. (Rh. 1393b4-8) 
It is clear that what Aristotle is here describing is an expert-analogy, and he even refers to it 
as Socratic
63
. The discussion of paradigm in APr. B 24 is far from as clear as this, and there 
he only mentions the first type of paradigms. Still, there are points of interest in the chapter 
that are not found in the passage discussed just above, particularly as Aristotle here presents 
the logical form of a paradigm and separates it from induction, and I think it worthwhile 
quoting: 
We have an example when the extreme is proved to belong to the middle by means of 
a term which resembles the third. It must be familiar both that the middle belongs to 
the third term, and that the first belongs to that which resembles the third. For example 
let A be evil, B making war against neighbours, C Athenians against Thebans, D 
Thebans against Phocians. If then we wish to prove that to fight with the Thebans is an 
evil, we must assume that to fight against neighbours is an evil. Conviction of this is 
obtained from similar cases, e.g. that the war against the Phocians was an evil to the 
Thebans. Since then to fight against neighbours is an evil, and to fight against the 
Thebans is to fight against neighbours, it is clear that to fight against the Thebans is an 
evil. Now it is clear that B belongs to C and to D (for both are cases of making war 
upon one’s neighbours) and that A belongs to D (for the war against the Phocians did 
not turn out well for the Thebans); but that A belongs to B will be proved through D. 
Similarly if the conviction in the relation of the middle term to the extreme should be 
produced by several similar cases. Clearly then an example stands neither as part to 
whole, nor as whole to part, but rather as part to part, when both are subordinate to the 
same term, and one of them is familiar. It differs from induction, because induction 
starting from all the particular cases proves (as we saw) that the extreme belongs to 
the middle, and does not connect the deduction to the extreme, whereas argument by 
example does make this connexion and does not draw its proof from all the particular 
cases. (APr. 68b38-69a19) 
This passage informs us on a few points about the paradigm. First, that it is an argument from 
one known particular to another similar but unknown particular, viz. that it is a form of 
analogy. In this case, the known particular is D, which we also know has the attribute A. At 
the same time, it is known that both C and D belong under B, where B is the genus of C and 
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D, i.e. both C and D can be defined as wars made against one’s neighbour. In the paradigm, 
one first infers that A belongs to B, since both A and B belongs to D. I.e. the single particular 
D is said to prove that the attribute A belongs to the genus B. That allows one again to infer 
that C is A, since it has been established that A is B and we already know that C is B. What 
can be thought as problematic in this example of paradigm is the inference that B is A, in 
other words how one can infer that the attribute belongs per se to the genus. Aside from this 
point the argument seems above reproach logically, though some could find faults with the 
emphasis of the argument – viz. of applying it to a particular case, thus falling short of pure 
science. Ross briefly explains these two potential problems: 
The two characteristics by which A. distinguishes example from induction (69a17-19) 
both imply that it is not scientific but purely dialectical or rhetorical in character; in its 
first part it argues from one instance, or from several, not from all, and in doing so 
commits an obvious fallacy of illicit minor; and to its first part, in which a 
generalization is reached, it adds (in its second part) an application to a particular 
instance. Its real interest is not, like that of science, in generalization, but in inducing a 
particular belief, e.g. that a particular aggressive war will be dangerous to the country 
that wages it. (Ross 1949: 488) 
The second potential problem mentioned, viz. that it is applied, can be ignored by us here. 
The minor point is that it is a problem that any analogy will be faced with, and the major that 
it is not necessary for us to go through Aristotle’s view of science as this is a vast subject only 
remotely connected to our present inquiry. Let it suffice to say that though the example given 
may belong to politics rather than one of the sciences, what Aristotle does in this passage is 
present a form of argument, and that this form is not necessarily tied to politics or rhetoric. 
And thus the particulars may be of a more abstract nature. And after all, also the syllogism is 
an argument to a particular, though it argues from a universal. 
The first potential problem depends on the reading of the following lines: “but that A 
belongs to B will be proved through D. Similarly if the conviction in the relation of the middle 
term to the extreme should be produced by several similar cases.” The standard way of 
interpreting these lines, pace Ross, is that one goes from a premise where the term, B, is not 
used with reference to its whole extensions – i.e. one is only talking about the species D, not 
the whole genus B – to a conclusion where it is used in its whole extension. But this is a 
breach of a syllogistic rule, the illicit minor. The second sentence, however, says that what is 
produced is p…stij, which can mean proof, argument, conviction and even plain persuasion. 
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The wording in the first sentence is also ambiguous, as the word translated with proved 
normally simply means showed. Thus, there is great variance at how strong one should take 
the claim. Most commentators view it as being persuasive rather than demonstrative, 
belonging under rhetoric
64
. At the very least, there are strong indications that it is not an 
inductive proof by simple enumeration. It seems as if Aristotle is mainly thinking of D as a 
single example, and that he adds on as a second thought the line where it says that it is 
possible also to use more examples. But the adding of more examples does not seem to make 
any difference logically speaking to the validity of the conclusion. In Rh. 1394a10-18, he 
seems to be saying much the same thing. He says that it is preferable to first give an 
enthymeme
65
, and then a single example. But if an enthymeme is not available, one must give 
a large number of examples. But supposing that Aristotle is consistent, this would mean that a 
syllogism or enthymeme should precede the paradigm presented in APr. B 24. I fail to find 
such a thing in the text, but it is possible to take it such that the syllogism should precede the 
paradigm in one’s mind. To put it differently, that one has on a previous occasion 
demonstrated it with a syllogism or enthymeme
66
. On this interpretation one presumes the 
demonstration that A belongs to B. And D works such that one recollects this presumed 
demonstration, illustrating A as belonging to B as an example of it. This is but a tentative and 
in part speculative reading of the passage, but understood this way the result is that there is no 
induction involved in the argument, and it is not guilty of making an illicit minor
67
. This, if 
nothing else, is a point in favour of this interpretation. And in addition, the form of the 
paradigm will then be the same as my proposed form of the expert-analogy presented above. 
It will be an argument from one particular to another, where both belongs under a common 
genus, and where one presumes a previous demonstration proving that an attribute belongs to 
the genus per se. Still, assuming that this interpretation is correct, it has merely given us the 
form of the expert-analogy. We have not found a justification for the validity of this form. 
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V. 2. 4 Identity by genus & identity by analogy 
 
I suggest that the justification of the expert-analogy can be found by looking at Aristotle’s 
division of identity. This division is to be found in many parts of his corpus, but it has mainly 
been discussed by the commentators on Aristotle’s biology. 
Before discussing this division I do however wish to make a precision on the concepts 
of genus and differentia in Aristotle. Up to this point these concepts has been taken for 
granted, without this invoking any problems. But when discussing Aristotle’s biology, 
translating the Greek genos and eidos as genus and species are slightly problematic. The 
reason is that eidos in most, if not all, cases are not used for the biological concept of animal 
species. Pellegrin finds 4 uses of eidos: 1) a common sense, meaning ‘appearance’, 2) an 
historical sense, meaning the Platonic ideas, 3) a logical sense, as a sub-class of genos, and 4) 
a technical sense, as ‘form’ opposed to matter and as ‘formal cause’68. In contrast, he finds 
that when Aristotle “wants to designate an animal class (species or whatever) as coherent and 
autonomous, Aristotle uses the word gšnoj.” (Pellegrin 1985: 99) Obviously this would result 
in problems when e.g. discussing Aristotle taxonomy of animals
69
. Up to this point genus and 
species has been used solely for the logical sense of genos and eidos, even during the 
discussion of homology. Thus translating the terms as genus and species has not given us any 
problems. But it makes good sense when discussing Aristotle’s biology to instead translate 
genos with ‘kind’ and eidos with ‘form (of a kind)’70. However, I want to continue to use 
genus and species in its purely logical sense, and the reader should not understand the terms 
to indicate a taxonomic system going from species to genus to family and so on. 
For Aristotle identity is an equivocal term, and he operates with 4 types of identity. 
These are identity in number, in species, in genus, and in analogy
71
. Of these, identity in 
number is what we would normally call identical, e.g. that the person writing these lines are 
identical with me the author. Aristotle again divides numerical identity into three parts: 
identical in definition, in proprium and in reference to some accident, see Top. 103a23-31. 
This type of identity has received much attention, and is sure to do so in the future as well, but 
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it is not necessary for our present inquiry to elaborate any further on it. As regards the other 
three types of identity, it is clear that identity in species is identical to a higher degree than 
identity in genus, which again is identical to a higher degree than identity in analogy. This is 
clear from the following passage: 
Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by 
analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species those whose formula is one, 
in genus those to which the same figure of predication
72
 applies, by analogy those 
which are related as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter kinds of unity are always 
found when the former are, e.g. things that are one in number are one in species, while 
things that are one in species are not all one in number; but things that are one in 
species are all one in genus, while things that are so in genus are not all one in species 
but are all one by analogy; while things that are one by analogy are not all one in 
genus. (Metaph. D 1016b31-1017a3) 
He connects the concept of like with that of unlike, saying that “the uses of ‘unlike’ 
correspond to those of ‘like’.” (Metaph. D 1018a19) That which is identical numerically is not 
unlike, but that which is like in species can be unlike in number, etc. Thus there are varying 
degrees of likeness and unlikeness, going from that which is identical in number which is 
completely identical, through the 3 other kinds of identity, and lastly there is a 5
th
 group 
which is completely unidentical
73
. 
Now our expert-analogy is obviously neither identical in number nor in species. It is 
neither an argument about a specific doctor nor an argument about doctors. Rather it argues 
from one (or more than one) expert to another expert. However, it is not so clear if it is an 
identity in genus or identity in analogy. This question has serious consequences for the 
validity and justification of the expert-analogy, and I will argue for the position that it is based 
on identity in genus. 
Before looking at the passages in the biological works we should look at the 
discussion in APo. B 14. Here we find a justification for inferring an attribute on a species, as 
this attribute follows the genus. And then this is compared with doing the same in virtue of 
analogy. Allow me to quote the passage in full: 
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In order to grasp problems, one should excerpt both the anatomies and the divisions; 
and in this way, laying down the genus common to all the subject-matter, one should 
excerpt (if e.g. animals are under consideration) whatever belongs to every animal; 
and having got this, again excerpt whatever follows every case of the first of the 
remaining terms (e.g. if it is a bird, whatever follows bird), and always excerpt in this 
way whatever follows the nearest term. For it is clear that we shall now be in a 
position to state the reason why what follows the items under the common genus 
belongs to them—e.g. why it belongs to man or to horse. Let A be animal, B what 
follows every animal, and C, D, E individual animals. Well, it is clear why B belongs 
to D; for it does so because of A. Similarly in the other cases too, and the same 
account will always hold for the others. 
Now at present we argue in terms of the common names that have been handed 
down; but we must not only inquire in these cases, but also if anything else has been 
seen to belong in common, we must extract that and then inquire what it follows and 
what follows it—e.g. having a manyplies and not having upper incisors follow having 
horns; again, we should inquire what having horns follows. For it is clear why what 
we have mentioned will belong to them; for it will belong because they have horns. 
Again, another way is excerpting in virtue of analogy; for you cannot get one 
identical thing which pounce and spine and bone should be called; but there will be 
things that follow them too, as though there were some single nature of this sort. (APo. 
98a1-23) 
The chapter begins saying that when for instance studying an individual species
74
 of animal 
one should first look at what belongs to the genus. Then the animal has these attributes 
because the animal is a part of the genus. Likewise for what belong to the species; then it has 
these attributes because it is a part of the species. In the next paragraph he says that one can 
infer from the animal possessing one attribute to it possessing another, if having the one 
follows from having the other. E.g. if not having upper incisors follow from having horns (as 
it belongs to the genus ‘horned animals’), and again having a third stomach follows from not 
having upper incisors. However these terms are not convertible, as e.g. the camel has a third 
stomach and lacks upper incisors, but it does not have horns
75
. And in the last paragraph he 
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says that one thing might also follow from another in virtue of analogy, even though the 
analogical parts do not share a common name and a single nature. 
There is some disagreement on how one should understand the purpose of this chapter, 
specifically the opening words, “to grasp problems” (œcein t¦ probl»mata). Barnes says that 
it “is probably to acquire premisses appropriate to its solution” (Barnes 2002: 250), viz. to the 
solution of the problem. The problem could then e.g. be ‘does the deer have upper incisors or 
not’, the answer being a negative one because this follows from the deer being one of the 
horned animals.  In contrast Ross follows a suggestion by Zabarella, and thinks that it is not 
concerned with finding premisses and solving problems, but of formulating problems 
scientifically
76
. On this interpretation one reduces the unscientific problem of why the deer 
lacks upper incisors to the scientific problem of why horned animals lack upper incisors. 
These two interpretations are unified by Balme and Lennox, and this is the interpretation that 
I find most convincing. Balme summarises the chapter thus: “he says that by picking out what 
is common to animals and seeing what further attributes are implied by it, we shall see the 
cause of the specific attributes [...]” (Balme 1992: 72) Further, “the first necessary step is to 
pick out correctly the fundamental generic attributes, because they either are, or point to, the 
causes of the specific attributes: without the generic attributes, explanation cannot begin.” 
(Balme 1992: 73) Thus the cause of the specific attributes is to be found in a general attribute 
belonging to the genus. E.g. “to see deer, antelope and oxen as all horn-bearers is to recognize 
in them a common nature in virtue of which a number of features common to them can be 
understood.” Lennox 1987: 116) In contrast, it would not be possible to explain the features 
following from being a horned animal, if one only treated it at level of the species, e.g. deer. 
The passage thus states a methodological principle. Begin by looking at what belongs at the 
most general level, and then look at its species, etc. because the explanation of the attribute is 
found by connecting it to its proper subject
77
. This same principle is found elsewhere in the 
APo. “E.g. having angles equal to two right angles belongs to isosceles and to scalene in 
virtue of something common (for it belongs to them as figures of a certain sort and not as 
different things).” (84b6-9)78 And in APo. 74a26-b4 he says that if one knows separately that 
the equilateral and the scalene and the isosceles has two right angles, one does not know it 
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universally of a triangle, and one does not have a universal demonstration. First then does one 
know it per se ( ) rather than per accidens (kat¦ sumbebhkÒj)
79
. 
This methodological principle is then connected together with the paragraph on 
analogy. In the example of the pounce and spine and bone, one can see that they have 
common attributes. However, one has not discovered the generic nature that explains these 
similarities. That nature is unknown to us, and therefore one does not have a name, a genus, 
that these three are gathered under – and therefore one also does not have an explanation for 
these common attributes. Such an explanation would presumably either be one by definition 
or by proprium, in order for it to be per se. It would obviously not be sufficient to just give it 
a name: “Aristotle evidently does not regard classification as arbitrary, serving only tidiness 
and convenience of reference. Its aim is to reveal the common causal attributes, and the 
specific attributes flowing from them.” (Balme 1992: 73) 
The division between the identical in genus and in analogy is further developed in the 
biological works. Here the various parts of animals belonging under a common genus are said 
to differ in excess and defect (  Øperoc¾n kaˆ œlleiyin), in contrast to those that are only 
identical by analogy
80
. And it is because e.g. Water animals and Winged animals do not differ 
in excess and defect (viz. in degrees) that these two are not grouped under a common genus: 
Groups that only differ in degree, and in the more or less of an identical element that 
they possess, are aggregated under a single class; groups whose attributes are only 
analogous are separated. For instance, bird differs from bird by gradation, or by excess 
and defect—some birds have long feathers, others short ones. Bird and Fish only agree 
in having analogous organs; for what in the bird is feather, in the fish is scale. (PA 
644a16-23) 
After this there follows a rather trivial argument why one should not study each species 
separately, rather than first looking at what is common to the genus as described in APo. B 14. 
The trivial argument given is that this would be needless repetition. But the argument given in 
the Posterior Analytics “provides a much more powerful reason for seeking to grasp common 
attributes according to kind, rather than case by case.” (Lennox 2001a: 170) It is peculiar that 
Aristotle does not give this explanation in the PA, but I see no foundation for speculating on 
this issue. The methodological principle is at least the same though the justification of it 
                                               
79 Although see Tiles 1983 for the problematic passage in Metaph. D 1025a30-34 where Aristotle says this is 
 
80 Cf. HA 486a16-b21, 488b30-32 and 491a18. 
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differs. After this follows a paragraph further explaining the difference between likeness in 
genus and in analogy: 
It is generally similarity in the shape of particular organs, or of the whole body, that 
has determined the formation of the larger groups. It is in virtue of such a similarity 
that Bird, Fishes, Cephalopoda, and Testacea have been made to form each a separate 
class. For within the limits of each such class, the parts do not differ in that they have 
no nearer resemblance than that of analogy—such as exists between the bone of man 
and the spine of fish—but differ merely in respect of such corporeal conditions as 
largeness smallness, softness hardness, smoothness roughness, and other similar 
oppositions, or, in one word, in respect of degree. (PA 644b8-15) 
It is not quite obvious how one should take the difference between the two. It is clear that 
though in general the identical in genus differ as to measurable variation of parts, such things 
as manner of life, actions, character traits etc. are also involved
81
. And likewise, one should 
not understand the identical in analogy too narrowly, and confine it to having the same 
function or relation. E.g. the bone of man and the spine of fish have more similarities than 
merely having the same function
82
. In addition function also seems to be an essential concept 
for Aristotle when discussing what belongs to a genus or a species, along with that of part
83
. 




We are faced with some difficulty when applying this beyond its use in biology. 
Differences in such as softness and hardness seems at the very least to be limited to the 
empirical sciences. To say that a doctor is bigger or softer or smoother (and other measurable 
differences) than a captain is incomprehensible – yet both are experts, and thus belong under a 
common genus. Pellegrin has suggested that “the Aristotelian genos is, both in properties and 
in functioning, a unity of contraries.” (Pellegrin 1987: 318) The examples that Aristotle gives 
are contraries, which further admits of degrees. The soft is the contrary to the hard, but there 
are degrees of softness and hardness. Pellegrin supports this interpretation on Metaph. I 3-4: 
[...] that which is different from anything is different in some respect, so that there 
must be something identical whereby they differ. And this identical thing is genus or 
species; for all things that differ differ either in genus or species, in genus if the things 
                                               
81
 Cf. Lennox 2001a: 171-172 and Balme 1992: 122. 
82 Cf. Lennox 2001a: 168. 
83
 Cf. PA 645b15-646a5. 
84 Cf. Balme 1992: 120. 
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have not their matter in common and are not generated out of each other (i.e. if they 
belong to different figures of predication), and in species if they have the same genus 
(the genus is that same thing which both the different things are said to be in respect of 
their substance). (Metaph. 1054b25-31) 
Since things which differ may differ from one another more or less, there is 
also a greatest difference, and this I call contrariety. [...] For things which differ in 
genus have no way to one another, but are too far distant and are not comparable; and 
for things that differ in species the extremes from which generation takes place are the 
contraries [...] (Metaph. 1055a4-9) 
And of the things which are dealt with by the same faculty the most different 
are contrary; for one science deals with one class of things, and in these the complete 
difference is the greatest. (Metaph. 1055a30-33) 
We see repeated (from the passage cited from Metaph. D above) the point that things 
belonging to the same genus does so by belonging to the same figure of predication
85
. In the 
first passage, it should not be taken to say that when they differ they still share some attribute, 
but rather that “if A differs from B in genus, B also differs from A in genus; if in species, then 
in species.” (Ross 1924: B 288) The attributes may differ in degree, but it still relates itself to 
the common genus
86
.Cf. with a paraphrase given by Lennox: 
For two individuals to differ in degree, they must both be the same general sort of 
thing. With respect to that sort they do not differ in degree. But the general sort is 
constituted of features with range – any sub-kind may have those features exemplified 
by different specifications of that range. (Lennox 2001b: 167) 
In the next passage cited we see that contrariety is described as the maximum difference 
possible within a genus. I take this to mean that e.g. black and white are contrarieties, with 
various scales of grey being the various degrees of difference that are yet not contrarieties, as 
these differ in species. But white is not comparable to e.g. soft
87
, as these differ in genus and 
are different figures of predication. 
In the last passage cited it is further said that each science (™pist»mh)88 is confined to 
dealing with a single genus, this genus then being the science’s subject-matter. It is far from 
evident what implications this gives, but it seems reasonable to connect this with the passage 
                                               
85 And the two books should obviously be read together, cf. Ross 1924: B 288. 
86
 Cf. Pellegrin 1987: 321. 
87 Except perhaps metaphorically. 
88
 In this passage it is reasonable to assume that science is used in Aristotle’s broad rather than narrow 
meaning, including both the theoretical sciences and the various expert-knowledges. 
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from the APo. By studying a subject at its genus it is then possible to get an explanation, 
while if one study things across different genera a common explanation is impossible, the 
subjects being too far distant and incomparable. “It is the lack of a path between one genos 
and another which, in the theory of knowledge, is the basis of the doctrine of ‘the 
incommunicability of genera’ which has the consequence that there is only one science per 
genos. Nevertheless there is a possible relation between the genē, and that is the relation of 
analogy.” (Pellegrin 1987: 321-322) But at the same time it is clear that this analogy cannot, 
unlike a relation under a genus, give an explanation: “demonstration does not apply to another 
genus [...]” (APo. 76a22) 
Aristotle further elaborates on the relation between contrariety, genus, and species in 
Metaph. I 9-10. Black and white men (and likewise man and woman) are contrarieties, but a 
black man and a white man still belong to the same species. In contrast such contrarieties as 
‘with feet’ and ‘with wings’ do make a difference in species. 
Perhaps it is because the former are modifications peculiar to the genus, and the latter 
are less so. And since one element is formula and one is matter, contrarieties which 
are in the formula make a difference in species, but those which are in the compound 
material thing do not make one. (Metaph. 1058a37-b2)  
Pace Ross 1924: B 303, this should be interpreted so that accidental contrarieties (e.g. colour) 
does not make a difference in species, while per se contrarieties (e.g. footed or winged) makes 
a difference and will be a differentia modifying the genus. Further, the modification must be 
one in substance and not matter – though male and female are modifications of ‘animal’ and 
not ‘man’, they are modifications of matter and therefore man and woman belong to the same 
species. The implication for the difference between contrarieties under the same genus, and 
those without a common genus, must then be that those under a genus share the same form 
(lÒgoj), while those not under a genus differ in form. 
However, this can be problematized somewhat. In the biological works what is 
analogous under one inquiry, may belong under the same genus in another. Pellegrin 
discusses PA 653b35 and 655a33, and says that “in the first case we have two genē, bony 
animals and cartilaginous animals, which have between them an analogical relationship; but 
in the second [...] bone and cartilage are two different ‘species’ of matter employed by nature 
as ‘support’ of the body [...]” (Pellegrin 1987: 329) A possible solution would be to say that 
the inquiry in the two cases are somewhat different, and so is the form that they inquire on.  
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To sum up our current discussion, we can say that the identical by analogy is different 
from the identical by genus. The difference is that the identical by genus shares the same 
form. However, this form is differentiated over various contrarieties (the more or less), and 
these contrarieties belonging per se. Two species thus share the same form, but has different 
per se attributes (either in the form of the differentia in the definition or different proprium). 
And the study of each genus belongs to a separate science. The identical by analogy does not 
share the same form, and are in a certain sense incomparable and in another sense similar. As 
they do not have a common genus there is no science which field of study are these analogical 
features, and there is no common explanation behind them. 
Undoubtedly the form of the expert-analogy outlined above fits perfectly with the 
theory of the identical by genus. Aristotle’s discussion of this gives a good justification for 
drawing inferences from two species under the same genus. On a certain level of generality 
the two particulars are seen as identical, as sharing the same form, and therefore validating an 
inference from the one to the other.  
 
V. 3 Concluding remarks on the justification of the expert-
analogy 
 
In the previous section we have seen how my interpretation of the structure of the expert-
analogy fits with Aristotle’s concept of paradigm, provided that one interprets this as an 
argument from particular to particular, through a genus that is assumed. Robinson found hints 
of the same in Plato, but with Aristotle we have a conception and discussion of it. Further, we 
found a justification of it in Aristotle’s division between the identical in genus and the 
identical by analogy. I do not think this justification is necessarily in conflict with Plato, and 
at the very least it is less so than e.g. Plato’s use of imagery and metaphors. The expert-
analogy should not be taken to argue from appearances (thus contrasted with imagery and 
metaphors), but instead between ideas that are coordinate under a genus.  Yet a few issues 
related to our interpretation of the expert-analogy are still left unanswered. 
First, there is the question whether the expert-analogy can be said to be a valid 
deduction. Aristotle’s definition of deduction is pretty close to our modern one, saying that 
“when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition 
must also be true in consequence [...]” (Rh. 1356b15-16) This certainly seems to hold for an 
inference from one species to another. The form looks valid, and if the premisses are true the 
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conclusion should be valid. The commentators on analogy in Aristotle seem unanimous on 
this. Speaking on the concept of analogy Olshewsky says that “there is no problem for its use 
within a particular genus, but there is a necessary ambivalence about its role beyond.” 
(Olshewsky 1968: 9) Lloyd presupposes the same when he says the following: 
But how, if sameness and oneness by analogy transcend the genus, as in both the 
metaphysical and the zoological uses, does that not breach those requirements? How 
can there be understanding, in the strict sense there defined, of any such cases, if 
understanding is limited to the genus? (Lloyd 1996: 142) 
However, the argument could still be criticised. Aristotle requires that the premisses “be both 
explanatory and more familiar and prior [...]” (APo. 71b29-30) Viz. one should both infer 
from what is better known to what is less known, and it should be explanatory. It should be 
obvious that e.g. in the expert-analogy the expert which one infers from should be better 
known than the one we infers to. Thus this requirement is satisfied. Further the attribute 
inferred should belong per se to the genus, either belonging to the definition or be a proprium. 
In this regard it is in a certain regard explanatory, as it points to the genus where the 
explanation is to be found. In contrast, an analogy without a common genus would not satisfy 
this requirement. Nor does the expert-analogy seem to use any fallacies in dictione. The terms 
are used univocally, i.e. they do not for instance use a metaphorical meaning in one premise, 
or in general use a term in two different meanings. 
There are better reasons for thinking it might use a fallacy extra dictionem, namely it 
can be argued that it is a petitio principii (begging the question). And related to this is the 
charge that it is a truism. Let me first deal with the charge of truism. It could be argued that 
the expert-analogy would not be an inference, but rather one would just be pointing out 
something self-evident. Take for instance the following expert-analogy: If the general should 
command the army, then the statesman should command the state. Pace Vlastos
89
 one could 
say that the conclusion is built into what an expert is. The expert is the one that should do the 
task that he is an expert on. There is a truism when one says that ‘he is a bachelor thus he is 
an unmarried man’, because being an unmarried man is what a bachelor is. It follows by 
definition. However, a truism is such that it states something that is self-evident. Yet the 
usage in Plato and Aristotle of the expert-analogy gives us no indication that the conclusions 
                                               
89 Cf. Vlastos 1991: 268. 
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arrived at are self-evident. The conclusions are, almost without exception
90
, accepted, but 
there are no textual indications that they are self-evident. In fact, the conclusions that 
Socrates’ interlocutors are made to accept are often surprising to them. Take e.g. the 
discussion in Rival Lovers 136a-e, where Socrates’ interlocutor proposes a definition of the 
philosopher. After a few expert-analogies, all ending in a reductio ad absurdum, the 
interlocutor is forced to accept the conclusion that philosophy is actually useless. If the 
analogies had been self-evident, this would hardly have happened. Yet it is frequent in Plato’s 
dialogues. Likewise, it is extremely unlikely that Aristotle would make use of expert-
analogies as frequently as he does, if their conclusion had been self-evident. 
The charge of it being a petitio principii is related to that of it being a truism. With a 
truism the conclusion is built into the key term, while with a petitio principii the conclusion is 
built into one of the premises. At the same time there is an essential difference between the 
two. The premises in a valid deduction must necessarily contain the conclusion, but the truth 
of the premises should not depend on the conclusion. “Now the essence of a petitio principii 
is that it assumes two propositions of which one or other cannot be known unless the 
conclusion is already known [...]” (Ross 1939-1940: 17) It is clear that one can know 
something about the genus and one of its species without necessarily knowing one of its other 
species. One must know that what one infers to is a species of the common genus, but the 
premisses can be proven independent of proving the conclusion. E.g. 1) The doctor can 
charge money for the teaching of medicine because he is an expert. 2) The logician is an 
expert. 3) Therefore the logician can charge money for the teaching of logic. The first premise 
can be proved by the fact that students pay to learn medicine, and they do so because the 
doctor has expert knowledge, and further because he is an expert he has the ability to convey 
that knowledge to others. The second premise can be proved by knowing that logic should be 
defined as an art. And the conclusion would not be self-evident before Aristotle begun 
teaching logic, and thus wouldn’t be a truism. So the premises in an expert-analogy do not 
necessarily assume the conclusion, though like all deductive arguments they might do so
91
. 
Though if the attribute inferred is one belonging to the definition of the genus, so that one 
could only know that it belonged to the genus by observing that it possesses that attribute, one 
would be guilty of committing the fallacy. In contrast to if one infers an attribute that is a 
proprium but not a part of the definition. 
                                               
90 Callicles in the Gorgias, and partly Protagoras in the dialogue of the same name, are the main occurrences, 
cf. Roochnik 1996 ch. 3. Also in some respects Thrasymachus in R. I. cf. Henderson 1970. 
91 Cf. Joseph 1916: 301-304. 
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However the fallacy of petitio principii is not relevant if one is constructing a reductio 
ad absurdum, which Socrates frequently does. Such an argument sets out to prove that one of 
the premises is not true, and does therefore not assume that all the premises are true.  
Second, one is faced with the question why one should use an analogy rather than a 
deduction. I.e. why argue from a particular and assume a genus working as a universal, rather 
than just use a universal premise?  Here I can but give a few suggestions. First, there might be 
a dialectical reason for doing so. Leaving the universal implicit can make the interlocutor 
accept a premise that he otherwise would not give his assent to, since with the universal made 
explicit it might be easier for the interlocutor to spot where the argument is going. Cf. Top. 
VIII 1: “The necessary propositions through which the deduction is affected, ought not to be 
propounded directly in so many words. Rather one should keep as far away from them as 
possible.” (Top 155b28-30) Often Socrates depends on the interlocutor not understanding 
where the argument is going, since if the interlocutor understood that he would not accept the 
necessary premises
92
. Second, Aristotle notes that it is easier to spot equivocity in the 
particular than in the more universal: 
And it is easier to define the particular than the universal—that is why one should 
cross from the particulars to the universals. For homonymies escape notice in what is 
universal more than in what is undifferentiated. (APo. 97b28-30) 
As we know it is necessary in a deduction for the terms to be used univocally, and thus there 
could be some value in giving a particular and leaving the universal implied. Further Aristotle 
says that the particular is nearer by our senses while the universal is nearer in explanation 
(e.g. Ph. 189a6-8), but this is hardly applicable to Plato. Third there are rhetorical or poetical 
reasons for rather using particulars; see the discussion of paradigm, metaphors and images 
above. Needless to say none of these suggestions, taken together or separately, are entirely 
satisfactory. We can but be satisfied with the fact that analogies are used by Plato and 





                                               
92 Cf. Robinson 1953: 38-9. 
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VI Discussion on a few cases of expert-analogies 
 
In many cases it would be obvious that our expert-analogy would be identical by genus. An 
argument from one established expert, e.g. the doctor, to another established expert, e.g. the 
ship’s captain, has a common genus and shares in a sense the same form. It is perhaps not so 
obvious if arguing to a non-established expert, e.g. Plato arguing from the ship’s captain to 
the politician. Even more so when Aristotle argues from the doctor to the moral agent, as we 
do not typically think of these as sharing a common name and form.  
I will be looking at a selected few examples of the expert-analogy, viz. passages that 
are normally thought to be problematic. First seeing if they can be interpreted as an inference 
between two species of the same genus, and second seeing if this interpretation can improve 
our understanding of these examples. 
 
VI. 1  Plato’s analogy of the captain and the politician in R. VI 
488a-489c 
 
First, let us look at the analogy of the ship in R. VI 488a-489c. The context of the passage is a 
question raised by Adeimantus: “How, then, can it be true to say that there will be no end to 
evils in our cities until philosophers—people we agree to be useless—rule in them.” (R. 487e) 
Plato answers this by presenting an image of a ship where the ship-owner is hard of hearing, 
short-sighted, knows little of seafaring, but is bigger and stronger than anyone else on board. 
The sailors flocks around him, stupefies the ship-owner with wine etc., and attempts to 
persuade him to let control over the ship over to oneself. And those who do succeed in 
persuading him are often killed by the others. The one who manages to acquire control of the 
ship are called the captain, but all the while the true captain who possesses the expertise is 
seen as a useless stargazer. And Plato says that the ship in the image resemble cities and their 
attitude to the true philosopher. Further, the true captain does not beg the sailors and ship-
owner to allow him to rule over them (in contrast to the sailors in the image). Rather, the 
natural thing is for them to come begging to him. And it is the same with the true statesman – 
he does not beg the citizens like the politicians that now rule, but instead the citizens should 
come begging to him. 
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Bambrough says that “Plato takes the crucial step in the wrong direction when he 
draws a parallel between a governor’s choice of a policy and a navigator’s setting of a course 
[...] The true analogy is between the choice of a policy by a politician and the choice of a 
destination by the owner or passengers of a ship.” (Bambrough 1971: 194) I think Bambrough 
misses the point. Although it might be true that the statesman sets the goal as well as directing 
the city towards this goal, it is not clear that Plato held this view of the statesman – and this 
analogy indicates that he probably did not. Further, Tiles, in his criticism of Bambrough, 
remarks that the analogy is to the ship-owner, not the captain: “Plato does not speak of a 
‘navigator’, a ‘kubern»thj’, but a ‘naÚklhroj’, which strictly means ‘ship-owner’...” (Tiles 
1984: 60) But this is also a misunderstanding. It is actually a proportional analogy, saying that 
the relation between the ship-owner and the captain is analogous to the relation between the 
citizens and the statesman (i.e. the philosopher king). One infers from the proposition that the 
captain is the one who should rule the ship to the conclusion that the philosopher is the one 
who should rule the city. This is done by a reductio ad absurdum, showing what it would be if 
the captain did not rule the ship – yet, this absurd situation is the one that the statesman is in. 
But the analogy is more than just a proportional analogy. In presenting the absurd situation of 
the true captain being ignored, and not being allowed to steer the ship, Plato is giving an 
image. And indeed he describes it himself as an image. It is a fictional story that has never 
happened, but is imaginable. In addition the comparison between the ship-owner and the 
dēmos does not seem to have as close relationship between each other as that between the 
statesman and the captain (for some elaboration of this see above). 
But the passage also contains an expert-analogy with the type of structure as I have 
presented above. Both the captain and the statesman (viz. philosopher) are experts. 1) The 
captain is the one who should steer the ship because he is the expert. 2) The statesman is an 
expert. 3) Therefore the statesman is the one who should rule the city-state. This assumes that 
governing of the city-state is the subject that the statesman is an expert on, but I think that is a 
premise that can be assumed. One can of course reject the second premise, and say that there 
in fact is no such expertise. In that case the argument would not be sounds, but it would still 
be a valid argument. And it is the same with the second part of the argument. 1) The captain 
should be asked to steer the ship because he is an expert
93
. 2) The statesman is an expert. 3) 
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The Statesman should be asked to rule the city-state because he is an expert
94
. An implication 
of this is that it is not the philosopher who is at fault for the widespread view that the 
philosopher is useless, as the fault lies in the dēmos not asking the philosopher to rule95. 
These two expert-analogies add quite a bit of content to the proportional analogy, and 
actually explain why the relation between the captain and the ship-owner is the same as the 
relation between the statesman and the city-state. The explanation is that both are experts. 
Thus this tie in with the Aristotelian methodological principle that an explanation should be 
sought at the highest genera, as the attribute then will belong to this genus per se, whereas it 
would just be accidental to the species. To sum up, I think my proposed structure of the 




VI. 2  Medicine and gymnastics as care for the body, 
philosophy as the care of the soul 
 
A particularly frequent expert analogy is that between medicine/gymnastics on the one hand 
and philosophy, viz. justice, on the other hand. While the first is said to be concerned with the 
health of the body, the second is concerned with the health of the soul. We have briefly 
touched on this issue above in the discussion on Santas and his interpretation of Cri. 47a-48a, 
where Santas suggested that one must presuppose the argument in Grg. 464a-465e. This is but 
one of many uses of the analogy between care of the body and care of the soul in the 
Gorgias
97
 (also 504a-505b, 517c-518a, 520a-522c). The analogy is also of central importance 
in R. 444c-445b, right at the end of book IV. 
                                               
94 This second argument can also be found in Pol. VII. 2, 1324b29-36. Note what Aristotle says: “The other arts 
and sciences offer no parallel [...]” Also for Aristotle the statesman is an expert, and in EN I. 2 he is even said to 
be the master expert. Though it occasionally also seems to fall under practical wisdom, cf. Reeve 1992: 75-6. 
95 This implication is noted in Benson 2011: 231. 
96 Another analogy using the captain can be found in the Hippocratic VM 9. Pace Jaeger 1957: 56 Plato took his 
example from this chapter. It is an analogy between the doctor and the captain. So long as the captain is sailing 
in calm sea one does not notice that he is a bad captain. But once the storm overtakes the ship, he will have 
caused the ship to be lost. And the argument goes that the same applies for a doctor. So long as they are 
treating patients with no serious complaint, the layman does not spot that he is a poor doctor. But if he gets a 
patient with a severe illness, then his deficiency is shown to all. The genus here are the expertise, but more 
precise than that it is the various expertise that are stochastic (tšcnh stocastik»), i.e. that involves to some 
extent chance. This kind of expertise has the proprium that chance can take over for the expertise, thus 
accomplishing the same goal. Thus both an incompetent captain and an incompetent doctor are mistaken to be 
good when chance accomplishes the goal for the expertise. And if these premises are true, then the analogy 
would be perfectly sound. 
97
 Gorgias himself drew an analogy saying that rhetoric is caring for the soul as medicine is caring for the body. 
See chapter I. 2 above.  
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In Grg. 464a-465e, the passage begins by saying that there is such a thing as a body 
and a soul, and that there is a state of fitness for each. There is also a state of appearing to be 
fit, such that only a doctor or gymnastic trainer would notice that the person’s body is not fit. 
Socrates then proposes that there is also such a thing for the fitness of the soul. Further, he 
says that there is one expertise for the fitness of the body, but that this expertise has two parts: 
medicine and gymnastics. Socrates again argues that it is the same for the fitness of the soul. 
There is one expertise, politics, with the two parts such that legislation is the counterpart to 
gymnastics, justice the counterpart to medicine. “Each member of these pairs has features in 
common with the other, medicine with gymnastics and justice with legislation, because 
they’re concerned with the same thing.” (Grg. 464c) At the same time there are four 
corresponding knacks (™mpeir…an) concerned with the appearance of fitness, which masks 
themselves with the corresponding expertise, pretending to in fact be the expertise. E.g. 
“pastry baking has put on the mask of medicine, and pretends to know the foods that are best 
for the body [...]” (Grg. 464d) If forced to compete before foolish men, on the question of 
which was the expert on good food and bad, the doctor would lose to the pastry baker. In the 
same way cosmetics masks itself as gymnastics, giving people an alien beauty instead of their 
own beauty that comes about through gymnastics. Then Socrates argues that “what cosmetics 
is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and what pastry baking is to medicine, oratory is 
to justice.” (Grg. 465c) But since these activities are so close, the sophist and the orator tends 
to be mixed together – and indeed if there had been no soul to govern the body, then medicine 
and pastry baking would be mixed together as well. 
This passage contains several analogies. Let us attempt to separate them into distinct 
and valid analogies. But first, the passage seems to mainly depend on a set of concepts that 
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One might say this passage is an early use of the Platonic method of division (dia…resij). 
There are however some remarkable differences between what we have in this passage 
compared to the passages using division in e.g. the Sophist and Statesman. There his concern 
is to do division until one comes to the term one is looking for, and this division is then the 
basis for a definition. E.g. if one was discussing justice one could say that the fields claiming 
to care for fitness can be either for the apparent or real fitness, then that this could be divided 
into the fitness of the body and of the soul, and that the fitness of the soul could be divided 
into outward fitness and inner fitness
99
, viz. justice and legislation. Justice could then be 
defined as the real care of the soul’s inner fitness. But this is clearly not what our passage 
does. Rather it explains these interconnected concepts, drawing analogies from one to 
another. As one can see the concepts are ordered in species under higher and higher genera. 
The genera are each divided into two using a contrary attribute, e.g. apparent and real. To a 
certain extent they infer parts of this structure from the structure of an analogous part. 
Now the first analogy is in 464a-b. From the cases of medicine and gymnastics, it is 
said that only an expert in these fields can separate the apparently fit person from the person 
that is really fit. From this it is inferred that the same applies for the experts on the fitness of 
the soul
100
, namely that they can separate the apparently fit person from the person that is 
really fit. This analogy infers something that is not obvious, that the expert in justice can spot 
that which is merely apparent fit in soul, from an analogous case where this attribute is 
                                               
99 This is not explicit, but I think the contrary attribute that here is the differentia is that one is care for the 
inner fitness while the other is care for the outer fitness. Alternatively one can take it to be the difference 
between the producing and the restoring, cf. Santas 2001: 133. But my interpretation does not depend on 
either reading. 
100 The name of these has not yet been given. 
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known. The analogy says that if the expert of medicine or gymnastics has this attribute 
because it belongs to the genus of expertise that care for real fitness, and if the expert in 
justice belongs to this genus as well, then the conclusion is valid. As one can see the analogy 
has the structure which I have presented above, and fits perfectly with the proposed 
justification of the structure given by Aristotle. 
After this (464b-465b) there follows an explanation of the connection between the 
various concepts, presenting the structure as illustrated above. Then it is finally said that 
“what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and what pastry baking is to 
medicine, oratory is to justice.” (Grg. 465c) I have tried to indicate this relationship by 
separating the eight expertise/knacks into two groups of four, one of these being a line further 
down than the other. The analogies given can then be formulated as two proportional 
analogies. Thus the first proportional analogy is saying that the relation between cosmetics 
and gymnastics is the same as the relation between sophistry and legislation. And it is 
likewise for the other proportional analogy. But if one were to take this passage as only 
indicating these two proportional analogies, ignoring the structure as presented above, one 
would but see a small part of the analogies. The proportional analogy in itself only says that 
e.g. cosmetics and gymnastics both claims to accomplish the same goal, only that cosmetics 
does so apparently while gymnastics does it actually. But on the basis of the structure of 
species and higher genera, one can actually make countless analogies. And these analogies 
will then be of the same form as the analogy in 464a-b, i.e. an analogy based on identity in 
genus. And indeed, Socrates does make several analogies based on this structure. 
In 504a-505b there is a couple of analogies based on this structure. First it is stated 
that physical trainers and doctors, as well as other experts, does not do whatever he does 
randomly, but rather he gives order and organization to e.g. the body. From this it is inferred 
that the expert on justice and legislation performs his expertise by giving order and 
organisation to the soul. Again this analogy can be made valid by presupposing that these 
share a common genus, and that this attribute, viz. that the expert gives order and organization 
to his subject, belongs per se to this genus. In this analogy we see perhaps a weakness in the 
structure between the various concepts as presented above
101
. Here he also refers to other 
expertise than medicine and gymnastics. It would then actually be preferable to organise 
medicine, gymnastics, justice and legislation under a sub-genera of all expertise. But this is a 
criticism of the soundness of the argument, and I do not think it would be too hard to alleviate 
                                               
101 The Platonic method of division was criticised by Aristotle partly because of this fault. 
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this deficiency by slight changes it the structure of the concepts. The next analogy, from 
504e-505b, says that a doctor does not allow a sick patient to eat and drink as much as he 
wants, i.e. to fill his appetites, as this would be harmful to the patient’s health. Thus when the 
soul is sick, the just man will not allow the sick soul to fill his appetites as this would be 
harmful. Again one must assume, to make the analogy valid, that this attribute belongs to the 
doctor because he is an expert concerned with fitness, and that the just man is also an expert 
concerned with fitness – which he is according to the illustration above. Some implications of 
this analogy seem to be deduced in Grg. 506d-507c, and it surely presupposes the analogies in 
504a-505b. 
Then in 517c-518a Socrates complains that Callicles several times has accepted the 
analogy between the care for the body and the care for the soul. But still he refuses to see the 
implications of this analogy. And a further analogy is given. It is said that various knacks (or 
possibly expertise can be allowed here) concerned with the body, e.g. a breadbaker, 
pastrychef, weaver, etc. are subservient, fulfilling any appetite one might have. But the proper 
expertise, gymnastics and medicine, are mistresses of these subservient ones
102
, because they 
have knowledge of what food and drink is good. Socrates then says the same holds for 
politics, which is the commanding expertise with knowledge of which of the appetites are 
good and bad. And this is the specific analogy that he says Callicles refuses to accept. Again, 
the analogy must assume that politics (viz. the expertise concerned with justice) shares a 
common genus with that of medicine, like the one given in 464a-465e, and that this attribute 
of being a commanding expertise over others belong to this genus per se, and only 
accidentally belongs to medicine and gymnastics. If so, the analogy once again has a valid 
logical structure. 
There are several analogies in Grg. 520a-522c. The first says that “sophistry is more to 
be admired than oratory, insofar as legislation is more admirable than the administration of 
justice, and gymnastics more than medicine.” (520b) The analogy says that because 
legislation is more admirable than justice, and gymnastics more than medicine, then sophistry 
is more admirable than oratory. As we have seen above, Plato thinks these six expertise can 
be sorted into two groups. It is however not clear why the one is said to be more admirable 
than the other. And again, we see a problem with Plato’s method of division. Still, he 
obviously thinks these two groups make up two different genera, and that one of these genera 
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 A parallel idea can be found in Aristotle’s EN I.1-2 1094a1-b12, where politics is said to be the most 
authoritative and master expertise. 
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is per se more admirable than the other. And thus the analogy has a valid form, though there 
seems to be some problems with the soundness of the analogy. 
After this there follows a deductive argument, explaining why it is wrong to take 
payment for giving advice on justice, when this is fine to do for all other expertise. The 
answer is that since the effect of this advice would be to make the person advised just, that 
person would then, because he has become just, himself desire to return the benefit as best as 
he can. Take notice that this is an attribute said to belong to the expertise of justice alone, and 
hence no analogy to any other expertise is possible. Instead it is contrasted to all other 
expertise. 
Next in 521a an analogy is given. Socrates asks if the care for the city is like a doctor 
or like one ready to serve. Since Callicles says it is like one ready to serve, Socrates then 
infers that care for the city will be a form of flattery. This analogy depends on what was said 
above, namely that the pastry-maker and the like are flatterers, while medicine governs these 
and says which appetite should be fulfilled. This is continued in 521d-522c. Socrates says he 
is the only one among contemporary Athenians to practice the true political expertise. Then 
he basically repeats the analogy from 464a-465e, indeed Socrates says that “the same account 
I applied to Polus comes back to me.” (Grg. 521e) Namely that if the doctor was put into a 
court of children by the pastry chef, then the doctor would lose the case. And likewise, if 
Socrates was put into a court of children (or adults that are like children) by an orator, then 
Socrates would lose. Here again the analogy is valid if the true expertise concerned with 
fitness per se has the attribute that the true expertise would lose against the apparent expertise 
in a court of children, and if Socrates is a true political expert. 
Finally there is the analogy in R. 444c-445b. It begins saying that “just and unjust 
actions are no different for the soul than healthy and unhealthy things are for the body.” 





. Therefore to produce justice in the soul, that which by nature should rule 
and be ruled should be set in this order. Again the analogy assumes that these share a common 
                                               
103
 This should probably be taken to refer to a teleology. And any expertise is in any way teleological, aiming for 
some goal. Cf. Santas 2001: 135-137 and Irwin 1995: 252-254. 
104
 It is not clear how to take this premise. It can either mean that one must have the expertise of medicine, 
and this then orders which appetites should be fulfilled and which should not. This would tie in with Grg, Or it 
can be taken to refer to the Hippocratic theory of powers, and that health is caused by a moderate blend of 
these powers (e.g. moderate temperature, not too much phlegm and bile) I think the first interpretation is the 
one to be preferred. while the second fits better the discussion in Ti. Cf. Hutchinson 1988 and Tracy 1969. In 
some ways, Santas is correct in saying that justice in R. is better known than health (Santas 2001: 135), but for 
his contemporary reader this would probably not be the case. 
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genus, perhaps the one outlined in Grg. 464a-465e. Further, he says that virtue is a kind of 
health of the soul, and vice a kind of sickness of the soul. The analogy that then follows seems 
a bit compressed, but it seems to say that since having a sick body makes life not worth living, 
and the soul is more important than the body, then having a vicious soul surely would make 
one’s life not worth living105. But the use of the analogy in the Republic is a bit more 
developed than that in the Gorgias, as Plato in book V adds the division of the soul, and the 
idea that justice in the soul is the correct ordering between these 3 parts of the soul
106
. And 
this addition, together with his analogy between justice in the soul and justice in the city
107
, 
allows one to go from a concept of justice more like our modern concept of modern health
108
 
to the concept of being just to others. And then in the Laws this is further developed with the 
division between free and slave doctors, and saying that the true statesman is like the free 
doctor (Lg. 720). 
As we have seen, these various analogies based on the analogous relation between 
care for the body and care for the soul all have the analogical structure that is based on a 
common genus with a per se attribute. This very common Platonic analogy is thus a good 




VI. 3  The expert-analogy in the Nicomachean Ethics, in 
particular the function-argument 
 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics contains several expert-analogies109, and many of them, in 
particular the function-argument in EN I. 7, play an essential role. Still I think the normal 
interpretation of the expert-analogies is in some respects deficient. Before I discuss the 
function-argument itself I will discuss the use of the expert-analogy throughout the work. I do 
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 The analogy then seems to be the same as in Cri. 47a-48a, which I have discussed above in chapter 2. 
106
 Cf, Hall 1971, who criticises Plato’s theory in Grg. as hedonistic, and as putting no moral responsibility on the 
moral agent, instead giving all responsibility to the active Statesman who makes the citizens just. 
107 Where of course justice is the common genus that validates the analogy. 
108 Pace Santas 2001: 134. 
109
 The expert-analogy is used extensively in other works as well. But I think Angier summarises it well when he 
says that “whereas his non-ethical writings rarely make use of craft-models in more than a merely illustrative or 
analogising fashion, it is precisely in his ethics that Aristotle oversteps the limits of this approach, allowing 
those models to do more of the argumentative work [...]” (Angier 2010: viii) 
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this because I think it is necessary, in order to understand the function-argument, to realise 
why it is used in his ethics. 
The first thing to realise about Aristotle’s use of the expert-analogy is that it is not 
evenly spread out throughout the work. In fact, his use of expert-analogies is limited to 
mainly two parts of the work. First, there is the part discussing the end as well as the virtues 
in general, from EN. I. 1 to II. 6. Second there is the part discussing the intellectual virtues in 
EN VI. Now there are cases of expert-analogies other places in the work, but there they are far 
from being as condensed as in those two parts. And perhaps more essentially, in those two 
parts the expert-analogy plays an essential role, and are key arguments. In contrast, elsewhere 
in the work the expert-analogies are often merely explicatory or periphery – one might even 
be tempted, though it should not be taken too far, to think of a remark by Wittgenstein: “a 
main cause of philosophical disease—a onesided diet: one nourishes one’s thinking on only 
one kind of example.”110 My suggestion is that this feature, viz. that the expert-analogy is 
used especially in EN. I. 1 to II 6 and EN VI, can be explained by the methodological 
principle that attributes should be explained at their highest genera, and then moving down to 
what is more and more specific. 
The structure of the EN is pretty straightforward, systematic and coherent
111
. It is 
basically composed of five parts (or possibly five treatises composed by an unknown 
editor
112
): 1) I to VI is on virtue, 2) VII is on self-control and lack of control, 3) VIII and IX is 
on friendship, 4) X. 1-5 is on pleasure, and 5) X. 6-8 is on happiness. The first part can again 
be divided into four parts. a) Book one is the introductory part concerned with stating the 
problem. b) Books II to III. 5 deals with virtue generally. g) Books. III. 6 to V deals with 
particular moral virtues. d) And Book VI deals with intellectual virtues. 
One can see that the two parts of NE that extensively rely on the expert-analogy are 
the introductory discussion that states the problems, the general discussion of the virtues, and 
the discussion of the intellectual virtues. My suggestion is that these parts discuss in many 
ways the general issues that are common for the virtues as well as the expertise. I.e. the 
subject of these discussions is often not virtue as such, but a genus of which virtue is a 
species. 
I think this suggestion can be supported by looking at the proposed definition of 
human good given in EN I. 7, and the definition of virtue given in EN II. 6. The first is 
                                               
110 Quoted in Dunne 1997: 310. 
111
 Cf. Lloyd 1968: 202-3. 
112 Cf. Pakaluk 2011: 24. 
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defined when Aristotle says that “human good turns out to be activity of soul [yucÁj ™nšrgeia] 
in conformity with excellence [...]” (EN 1098a16-17) This definition is repeated in EN 
1102a5-5 as chapter 13 continues the discussion from chapter 7, the chapters in-between 
dealing with various objections to this definition. Further, virtue (viz. excellence) is defined in 
EN II. 5 and 6: 
Excellence, then, is a state [›xij] concerned with choice [proairetik»], lying in a mean 
relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of 
practical wisdom [Ð frÒnimoj] would determine it. (EN 1106b36-1107a2) 
It is then quite clear how virtue is related to the expertise. Virtue is defined as a state (the 
genus) concerned with choice (the differentia), the differentia being further elaborated after 
the comma. It is implicit in the discussion in EN II. 6 that expertise is also a state
113
, but this is 
made explicit in EN VI: “art is identical with a state [›xij] of capacity to make [poihtik»], 
involving a true course of reasoning.” (EN 1140a9-10) Thus both virtue and expertise shares 
the same genus, viz. state [›xij], but are not identical in species since virtue has the differentia 
concerned with choice [proairetik»] while expertise has the differentia capacity to make 
[poihtik»]. 
Now expertise is perhaps even closer related to practical wisdom [frÒnhsij].”Practical 
wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human 
goods.” (EN 1140b20-21) Both expertise and practical wisdom are a state of true reasoning. It 
is not evident if this also applies to the moral virtues, although they also in a sense belong to 
the rational part of the soul. Again the differentia between expertise and practical wisdom is 
different, in the one a capacity to make and in the other a capacity to act. 
At this point I should probably discuss an objection to this interpretation. Particularly 
in the discussion of practical wisdom Aristotle takes effort to differentiate it from precisely 
expertise. And even this differentiation is by many interpreters seen as deficient, and they 
claim that Aristotle was confused by the analogy between practical wisdom and expertise, 
blind to the serious disanalogies between the two. As an example of this pretty much standard 
view one can look at Broadie’s discussion:  
Since the medical analogy is misleading on this point, the fact that Aristotle reaches 
for it right at the start suggests a deeply entrenched way of thinking which he has to 
                                               
113 Met. 1025a6-13 might indicate otherwise, as its description of a capacity as something that can either be 
used in a good way (its proper use) as well as in a bad way. While a state entails that it is used only for one end. 
Cf. Irwin 1995: 70-71. 
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fight to resist. [...] This oblique influence of the analogy upon a philosopher so alive to 
its flaws is one potential source of obscurity and even incoherence in Aristotle’s 
account of practical wisdom, rational choice, and the ethical orthos logos. (Broadie 
1991: 191)  
Now it is true that there are considerable differences between the various expertise and 
practical wisdom, both those that Aristotle himself notes and perhaps also the additional 
differences that Broadie notes. If the analogies are taken to depend on the number of shared 
attributes, pace Santas, then Broadie’s criticism is perfectly valid. And there are strong 
evidence indicating that Broadie is using this interpretation. E.g. she seems to say that much 
of the fault is that he uses medicine rather than any other expertise, as other expertise seems to 
have more attributes in common with practical wisdom: “Were it not for the fact that 
Aristotle’s favourite example of skill in the Ethics is his father’s craft of medicine114, we 
might find no difficulty in accepting the analogy of skill with practical knowledge.” (Broadie 
1991: 197). In contrast, if one is using my proposed structure of the expert-analogy, these 
differences are inconsequential. The number of similarities is not the issue; the issue is that 
the attribute being inferred belongs to both practical wisdom and medicine because the 
attribute belongs per se to a genus that they both belong under. When an attribute does not 
belong per se to practical wisdom, one uses an analogy to point to the genera where this 
attribute does belong per se E.g. 1141b14-20, where it is said that in medicine one needs to 
know both the universal and the particular, both that light meats are digestible and 
wholesome, and that light meats are e.g. chicken. And it is more important to know the 
particular, because then one might produce health, compared to knowing the universal. This is 
a property of medicine because medicine and other expertise is practical, in contrast to 
theoretical knowledge, and further practical wisdom belongs under this genus as well. 
Therefore one can infer that the same holds for practical wisdom. But then, when discussing 
an attribute that does belong per se to practical wisdom, e.g. action in contrast to making in 
EN VI. 4-5, one makes sure to separate practical wisdom from expertise. In this respect they 
are contraries, while in the analogy they were identical by genus. And again when expertise 
and practical wisdom is contrasted with theoretical knowledge in EN VI. 6, this is to say that 
                                               
114
 In passing it might be noted that Aristotle’s use of the medical analogy cannot as easily as some 
commentators have done be ascribed to his father being a doctor. Aristotle took the medical analogy from Plato, 
as well as medical concepts such as the mean and state, who again took it from the medical literature. See 
especially Jaeger 1957, but also Hutchinson 1988, Seidler 1978 and Longrigg 1963. 
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in this respect the property does not belong to a genus that includes theoretical knowledge, but 
instead a lower genus. 
With this as our foundation, let us go back to the definition of the human good. As it is 
said to be an activity [™nšrgeia] one expects there to also be a capacity [dÚnamij] which the 
activity is an actualization of. These two concepts are usually connected to each other in this 
way in Aristotle
115
. However, this seems to be in conflict with EN II. 5 where it is said that 
virtue is not a capacity but a state. I think this should be interpreted so that virtue is not 
merely having the capacity. In fact the three alternatives discussed, passions, faculties, and 
states, are all related to each other. E.g. “affections are actualizations of capacities and 
dispositions” (Broadie 2002: 302), i.e. a concrete passion comes about by actualization of a 
capacity to have this passion as well as a state such that in a certain situation one will have 
that passion. Such that the state depends on the existence of the capacity, but the state is what 
ensures that the capacity will be actualized only in the proper situation. 
Now what does Aristotle mean with an activity of soul [yucÁj ™nšrgeia]? This is 
clearly a wide term, encompassing much more than the human good alone. This is clear when 
he separates the activity of the soul characterising human good from the activities shared with 
other forms of life in 1097b32-1098a4. Life is common with plants, and therefore he excludes 
the life of nutrition and growth. Likewise perception is common to other animals. So he 
concluded that the distinctive human good is a rational activity of the soul. It would be 
rational because that is the part of the soul distinctive to man, and an activity because he 
implicitly assumes that the good cannot be a mere potentiality. This would then at least 
include moral activity, theoretical activity that gives wisdom, and expertise. It is however 
common to interpret the wording a bit above in 1098a3-4, “an active life”, so that it and the 
definition exclusively refers to moral activity, and excluding theoretical activity and 
expertise
116
 (cf. Broadie 1991: 36). This reading is however in many ways problematic, 
leading unnecessarily to more contradiction in the EN than what is necessary. Thus it seems 
preferable, and in better harmony with the text, to here take practical more loosely. From the 
preceding lines Aristotle makes clear that the activity is not to be taken as one obeying reason, 
but rather possessing and exercising it – and of these again, the more proper is the exercise of 
it. Practical then simply means exercising it, rather than simply having the capacity for it. 
                                               
115
 Vide e.g. Kosman 1984, Heinaman 1994 and Gotthelf 1984: 226-7. 
116 Cf. Broadie 1991: 36 & 42-50. 
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As is well known Aristotle entertains the possibility of both moral activity and 
theoretical activity (EN X. 6-8) being the excellence that is human good, but he rejects the 
possibility that expertise might be this excellence. It is an interesting question why Aristotle 
rejects the life of expertise, but this is hardly the place to discuss it. It is however highly 
relevant to see that these three are closely related. As we have seen Plato did not properly 
divide these three species from each other, all being viewed as some kind of expertise. The 
division is not always so strict in Aristotle either, and e.g. he describes both logic and rhetoric 
under the term of expertise. Looking once again at his definition of the human good, he might 
even be using virtue in a more loose sense, as being good at its function
117
. And used in this 
manner, his definition of the human good at this point would still include moral activity, 
theoretical activity, and expertise. Cf. EN 1098a9-12: 
[...] if we say a so-and-so have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player 
and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect 
of excellence being added to the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play 
the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well) [...] 
Let us now try and analyse the function-argument, in particular its structure. The function-
argument can be divided into two parts, the first argues that man has a function, and the 
second arrives at a definition of this function, saying something about what man’s function 
is
118
. In order not to make this discussion more elaborate than necessary I will confine myself 
to the first of these arguments, as this is both the most controversial argument and the one that 
is most obviously an expert-analogy. And I have already made some remarks on the second 
part of the argument above. The first part of the function-argument can be found in EN 
1097b24-32, after saying that one needs a clearer account of the chief good: 
This might be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a 
flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function 
or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it 
seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner 
certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he naturally functionless? Or as 
eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay 
it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? 
                                               
117 Cf. Broadie 1991: 37-39. Though he quickly (1099a18-20) moves over to using ‘virtue’ in the more narrow 
sense, as moral virtues e.g. justice and generosity. 
118 This second argument can again be divided into four parts, cf. Angier 2010: 60-61. 
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This argument is often taken to contain a fallacy of composition, arguing from what is true of 
the parts to what is true of the whole, and to be an unwarranted and failed induction. An 
alternative is to see it as illustrating what a function is, and as such being an intuitive 
induction
119
. Once again I think my proposed structure of the expert-analogy allows for a 
third interpretation. 
Now the argument seems to be able to be divided into two separate arguments. One is 
an expert-analogy while the other argues from organs to man. Let me at first quickly make a 
suggestion for the argument from organs to man, and afterwards give an interpretation of the 
expert-analogy. It is unclear how much of Aristotle’s biology should be presupposed in this 
argument. One should presuppose as much as is necessary to make it a good argument, but 
not more than is necessary. Now I think one must assume that the argument does not claim 
that the various parts of man each only have one function
120
. Take for instance the hand, 
which has functions such as gripping and holding, but also locomotion (e.g. a child crawling). 
Or take the chest, which both has the function of protecting the heart and in females the 
production of milk (cf. 688a18-25). ‘When Aristotle says “nature uses them as well for 
another function” at 688a23, he stresses the fact that the female breasts are viewed as 
primarily for this function, and only secondarily as repositories of nourishment.” (Lennox 
2001b: 263) I think the argument should be taken to say that the various parts of man, and that 
man himself, has at least one function. It cannot be taken to say that the various parts of man 
each only has one function, as this is obviously erroneous. But it does not seem necessary to 
assume it to say that if a part of man or man himself has more than one function, then one of 
these functions must the primary function, although 1098a17-18
121
 might indicate that this 
should be assumed. Thus the argument infers from the parts of man having at least one 
function each, to the conclusion that man himself must have at least one function. Now I have 
a suggestion for how this inference works, but this suggestion is but tentative. It is based on a 
method that Aristotle uses to identify a proprium (‡dion) as belonging to a genus, and his 
assertion that if it is a proprium then for that proprium there is a function: 
For an eye is for something, while being blue is not, unless (plēn) this affection is a 
property of the kind. (GA V.1 778a33-4) 
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 Cf. Broadie 2002: 276 and Angier 2010: 61, both of which presents the two alternatives although both also 
supports the interpretation that see it as an intuitive induction. 
120
 Cf. Angier 2010: 72. 
121 ”[...] and if there are more than one excellence, in conformity with the best and most complete.” 
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Aristotle apparently used the fact that a feature was a property (idion) of a 
biological kind as prima facie evidence that it exists for the sake of something. The 
above suggests that if a kind of animal were universally blue-eyed, being blue-eyed 
would in all likelihood have functional value. To take another example, while most 
forms of clawed crustacea have the right claw larger than the left, one group has the 
larger claw randomly distributed. Aristotle offers a teleological explanation for the 
difference in the former cases, but in the latter treats the size variation as a matter of 
chance, and not for the sake of anything (PA IV.8 684a25-32). (Lennox 2001b: 176) 
Now this suggestion assumes a considerable part of Aristotle’s teleology, and an 
interpretation that assumes less would be preferable. Still, I think using this suggestion might 
still be preferable compared to an interpretation where Aristotle commits a fallacy of 
composition. There is of course no necessity that Aristotle always was a perfect logician, but 
it is much more charitable to prefer to avoid too obvious logical fallacies. Now using my 
suggestion the argument looks something like this: 1) Every part of man has at least one 
function. 2) If an attribute is present in all the particulars of a universal, then this is evidence 
that this attribute is a proprium. 3) If something is a proprium, then the presence of that 
proprium has in all likelihood a function. 4) Thus, because it is a proprium that every part of 
man has at least one function, then that proprium in all likelihood has a function. This way 
one would avoid the fallacy of composition, as one does not infer from all the parts having a 
function directly to the conclusion that man has a function. I.e. one does not infer that because 
each part has a function, therefore the whole must have a function. Rather one first infers that 
having a function belongs as a proprium to all parts of man. Then, since this proprium must 
have a function as it is not a matter of chance, man has a function. The reader may judge for 
himself how successful this interpretation is, but as I said it is but a tentative suggestion. 
Now on the other part of the argument, namely the expert-analogy. If this analogy has 
the type of structure that I have defended, then there must be some genus which both the 
function of the various expertise and the function of man falls under. Again it is not clear how 
much one should read into the analogy. Directly following the analogy is the biological 
argument excluding the life of nutrition and growth, as well as the life of perception. I think it 
is reasonable to assume that these activities also fall under the genus that we are looking for, 
as they are possible functions of man. And the same applies to his actual answer, namely that 
it is an activity of soul in conformity with excellence. Now looking at this various things, it is 
clear that they are at least all forms of activity of the soul. Nutrition and growth are part of the 
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soul (in Aristotle’s meaning of the term), as is perception, and as is the various expertise. 
Excellence, though perhaps applicable to the expertise
122
, does not seem applicable to e.g. 
nutrition, and therefore this does not seem to be a part of the common genus. On the other 
side, restricting it to activity, without the addition that it is ‘of the soul’, seems wider than 
necessary. The genus would then include any form of activity, e.g. the sun heating a rock, but 
it is not clear that such an activity has a function, and Aristotle’s teleology is not necessarily 
applicable to such an occurrence. The best interpretation is then that the genus is ‘activity of 
the soul.’ Now the expert is “an agent who is devoted, paradigmatically, to a single activity, 
and an activity, moreover, which is specialized in nature.” (Angier 2010: 74) Put differently, 
an expert is engaged in a single activity of the soul, e.g. flute-playing, and this single activity 
has a function.  Now if an expertise has a single function because it is an activity of the soul, 
i.e. it belongs under the genus ‘activity of the soul’, and the human good also belongs under 
the genus ‘activity of the soul’, then the argument has the valid deductive structure that I am 
defending. Now the premise that might be doubted here is the one saying that the proprium of 
having a function belongs to the genus ‘activity of the soul’. But I think this premise follows 
from Aristotle’s teleology, more particularly the principle stated above in the discussion of the 
argument from parts of man. If there is an activity common among the whole group, e.g. 
perception is common to all animals, or flute-playing is common to all flute-players, then this 
activity must have a function. As Reeve notes, Aristotle also thinks that function is co-
dependent with activity, so that a lack of function implies inactivity
123
. Again I think this at 
the very least is a better interpretation than saying that it is a bad induction based on an 
insufficient number of cases. Taken like this it is a perfectly valid argument, though it has the 
deficiency that it is dependent on Aristotle’s teleology124. It would also be possible, pace 
Angier, to downplay the argument from parts of man and emphasise the expert-analogy – 
only this would not in any degree decrease the reliance on teleology, although I agree that the 
expert-analogy is a slightly better argument than the other one
125
. At the same time, this 
interpretation is perhaps less dependent on teleology than a pure teleological interpretation, 
and such a pure teleological interpretation that does not include the expert-analogy as 
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 Expertise is often treated as an intellectual virtue, e.g. Meyer 2008: 186. 
123
 Cf. Reeve 1992: 124. 
124 Though his teleology is usually also taken to be a necessary presupposition to the other part of the function-
argument, viz. that arrives at the definition. Cf. Santas 2001: 236-250. If it is true that his teleology must be 
presupposed for this part of the function-argument, it is natural to assume that one can presuppose it for the 
first part of the function-argument as well. 
125
 In particular Angier emphasizes that Aristotle takes the function-argument from Plato’s R. 352d-354a, but 
that he adds the references to the various expertise. Cf. Angier 2010: 78. 
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It would beyond doubt have been of interest to study many more of the expert-analogies, the 
implications of these interpretations, in what respect the analogies proposed are actually 
accepted by Plato
127
 and Aristotle, etc. Unfortunately this cannot be a comprehensive study of 
the expert-analogy. 
This thesis has limited itself to defending a new interpretation of the expert-analogy, 
where the analogy is seen to have a valid deductive structure. It argues from one or more 
species to another species, and the attribute inferred is presupposed to belong per se to the 
genus and only accidentally to the species. An indication of this structure was found in Plato, 
and it was argued that the structure could be found in Aristotle’s discussion of the paradigm. 
Further, a justification of this form of analogy was found in Aristotle’s discussion of identity 
in genus, as well as his methodological principle that an explanation should be given at the 
highest genera. 
However, it was still thought that the proposed interpretation of the expert-analogy 
needed further evidential support. This was done by discussing three separate types of expert-
analogies, where these were especially selected as the analogies are usually seen to be 
logically or philosophically problematic. I hope to have shown that it makes sense to interpret 
these such that they exhibit the type of analogy that I have been defending. 
The motivation throughout this thesis has been to attempt to make (Xenophon’s and) 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s use of analogies more consistent, particularly for Aristotle, with the 
view of them as being good logical philosophers. Unquestionably one will be able to find 
logical faults in their writings. But if by interpreting the expert-analogy differently one is able 
to interpret some of these without there being any logical faults, it would be highly preferable, 
and could deepen our understanding. 
But our thesis has perhaps shown even more than that. This thesis, as well as the 
problems discussed in it, begun with Richard Robinson. His was the first study on the form of 
the expert-analogy; his terminology has been with us throughout this thesis; and so it is 
perhaps fitting that the thesis should end on him as well. Robinson says the following in the 
preface to the second edition: 
                                               
127 On this issue see especially Irwin 1995, Roochnik 1992 & 1996. 
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This view, that logical truths are obvious and always have been obvious, entails that 
anyone who at any time in the past denied or disregarded any of these truths must have 
been stupid. Hence, when I say that Plato held a view of logic disagreeing with a view 
prevailing today, my creationist critics take me as saying that Plato was stupid. Thus 
Professor Wild wrote of ‘agreeing with ... Robinson that Plato was a very bad 
logician’ [...] But I did not say that Plato was a very bad logician, and I hold that he 
was a very great logician. Greatness in science consists mainly in leaving the subject 
much more advanced than when you entered it. It does not consist mainly in holding 
the same views as a majority of men will hold at a later date, or even in holding true 
views. (Robinson 1953: vi) 
May one be as bold as to say, providing the proposed structure of the expert-analogy here 
defended is true, that Socrates and Plato and Aristotle must be said to be greater logicians 
than previously thought? If they developed this logically valid form of analogy, or perhaps the 
honour should be given to Socrates alone, then they certainly advanced the field of logic even 
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